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Beyond Fukushima:  
Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law 
Lincoln L. Davies 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fukushima changed everything. That, at least, was a popular 
view espoused after the disaster of March 11, 2011—in the press, by 
the talking heads in the international media, and across the 
blogosphere.1 A nuclear meltdown in such a densely populated, well-
developed nation could scarcely do anything less than utterly 
transform how nuclear energy would be seen, used, and not used for 
years to come. 
That was the immediate reaction. As we inch away in time from 
the epicenter of the nuclear crisis at Fukushima Daiichi, however, the 
picture has become less stark than it often was painted in the days 
and weeks after the earthquake sounded, the tsunami struck, and a 
series of misjudgments, miscalculations, and chain reactions led to a 
partial meltdown of the Fukushima No. 1 power plant. 
 
 
 
 .  Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I 
thank Brigham Daniels and Lisa Grow Sun for their invitation to participate in this symposium, 
Joe Tomain for very helpful comments on an earlier draft, Jake Warner for his insight into 
planning as a tool, and the staff of the BYU Law Review, especially Mike Cannon and Joseph 
Walker, for their excellent work and patience. 
 1. See, e.g., Eun Young Chough, Fukushima Disaster: An End to the Nuclear 
Renaissance?, ASIA-PAC. BUS. & TECH. REP. (June 8, 2011), http://www.biztechreport.com/ 
story/1349-fukushima-disaster-end-nuclear-renaissance (“Whether the Fukushima disaster will 
signal the demise of the nuclear renaissance remains unclear, but countries will certainly 
continue to take measures to find ways to lessen their dependency on nuclear energy.”); Eben 
Harrell, Fukushima: The End of the Nuclear Renaissance?, TIME (Mar. 14, 2011, 2:17 PM), 
http://tinyurl.com/4nzv2zc (“As the continent watches in horror as Japanese officials 
scramble to prevent meltdown at three nuclear reactors in Northern Japan, countries that were 
once at the vanguard of a nuclear renaissance have begun to rethink and even, in some cases, 
reverse, their policies on nuclear power.”); Kevin Voigt & Irene Chapple, Fukushima and the 
‘Nuclear Renaissance’ that Wasn’t, CNN (Apr. 15, 2011, 10:00 AM), http:// 
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/15/fukushima-and-the-nuclear-renaissance-that-
wasnt/ (“A month after a devastating earthquake sent a wall of water across the Japanese 
landscape, the global terrain of the atomic power industry has been forever altered.”). 
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Nuclear power long has occupied a precarious position in our 
collective energy landscape. “Our country, indeed the world, has 
always viewed nuclear power with fear and fascination.”2 When a 
tragedy like Fukushima transpires, this fear and fascination spike. 
Though the harnessing of atoms to create electricity turned “swords 
into plowshares” long ago,3 there remains a view today that nuclear 
power—and its proponents—are “clearly evil.”4 Nuclear disasters like 
Fukushima create an opportunity for those who hold such views to 
advocate for a new energy course: one that abandons this energy 
source. 
Indeed, in the months after Fukushima, some nations announced 
their decision to forsake nuclear energy, Germany most prominent 
among them.5 Others, like Japan, weighed the idea, only to 
subsequently reject it,6 at least for the time being. By contrast, in the 
United States the non-nuclear option received little national political 
attention.7 Why? 
This Article takes up the tragedy at Fukushima Daiichi as a 
vehicle for parsing the role that disasters play in nuclear energy 
policy—and, by extension, in U.S. energy law generally. In the 
public discourse, energy law often orbits disasters. No one talks 
about our oil dependence until there is an Exxon Valdez or a 
Deepwater Horizon, and then it is conversation fodder for Starbucks 
runs. We flip switches all day long without wondering where our 
electrons come from, and then there is a Chernobyl, or Three Mile 
Island, or Fukushima, and anti-nuclear protestors take to the streets.8 
 
 2. Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 225 
(2005). 
 3. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 193–94 (1983). 
 4. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Stopping Nuclear Power Plants: A Memoir, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
35, 36 (2010). 
 5. Italy and Switzerland are the other prominent examples of nations that appear 
poised to join Germany in abandoning nuclear power post-Fukushima. See Daniel Aldrich, 
Nuclear Power’s Future in Japan and Abroad: The Fukushima Accident in Social and Political 
Perspective, PARISTECH REVIEW (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.paristechreview.com/ 
2011/08/25/nuclear-fukushima-accident-social-political-perspective/. 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Japan Crisis Could Rekindle U.S. Antinuclear Movement, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/ 
19/science/earth/19antinuke.html; Justin McCurry, Fukushima Protesters Urge Japan to 
Abandon Nuclear Power, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2011, 8:48 AM), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/19/fukushima-protesters-japan-nuclear-power. 
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“Energy policy-making in the United States is a cyclical enterprise,” 
Gary Bryner observed a decade ago.9 When there is a crisis on the 
news, “energy dominates the political agenda.”10 When there is not, 
“it fades into the background.”11 Energy disasters thus hold a 
tenuous relationship with energy policymaking. They create 
opportunities for change,12 but they also risk misdirecting the debate 
away from the truly important questions. 
This Article posits that energy disasters in the United States tend 
to perpetuate both of these effects. They often cause change, but this 
change tends to be incremental. At the same time, by “solving” the 
proximate causes of the disasters—and those causes alone—these 
modifications to energy law obfuscate the need to look more deeply 
at the underlying, root causes of our energy dilemmas.13 
These phenomena are largely a result of the dominant energy 
paradigm that dictates our energy laws and policy today.14 To 
mitigate the role that disasters play in shaping our law, disasters must 
be deemphasized as clarions for change. Alone, however, this will 
not be enough. A fundamental shift in our energy policy objectives 
and processes also is needed. By using nuclear energy itself as a 
metaphor for conceptualizing how U.S. energy law functions, this 
Article suggests that there are two primary changes that should be 
made to our system of energy governance. First, the goals of energy 
law should be realigned to reflect greater emphasis on sustainability. 
Second, energy law should employ more, and more robust, planning. 
Making these changes will not be easy. Nor will they solve our  
 
 9. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 341, 341 (2002). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. This, of course, is not unique to energy law. As Professor Hannah Wiseman has 
noted, “courts or legislatures often create law in reaction to events, rather than anticipating 
them.” Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables 
Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 827 (2011). 
 13. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 414 (1995) (“Environmental regulation is also needlessly complicated 
because it developed as Congress reacted to the environmental crisis of each particular year.”); 
William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Anna T. Moritz, The Worst Case and the Worst Example: An Agenda 
for Any Young Lawyer Who Wants to Save the World From Climate Chaos, 17 SOUTHEASTERN 
ENVTL. L.J. 295, 332 (2009) (“U.S. environmental law is already well-schooled in strategies of 
too late, long-since-gone, triage, sacrifice zones, and reluctance to send ‘good money after 
bad.’”); Amy J. Wildermuth, The Legacy of Exxon Valdez: How Do We Stop the Crisis?, 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 130, 131 (2009) (noting environmental law’s “triage approach”). 
 14. See infra Part V.A. 
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energy problems in toto. But they would improve our law, and thus, 
potentially our society as well. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes the meltdown 
at Fukushima. Part III summarizes three countries’ political and 
regulatory responses to the disaster: Germany, the United States, and 
Japan. Part IV conceptualizes U.S. energy law and its relation to 
energy disasters, using nuclear energy as a metaphor. Part V 
addresses critiques of our extant system of energy policy and possible 
responses thereto, including what such changes may mean for the 
future of nuclear energy in the United States. Part VI concludes. 
II. CHAIN REACTION 
“Crying is useless. If we’re in hell now all we can do is to crawl 
up towards heaven.”15 This was what one worker participating in the 
cleanup at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 170 miles 
north of Tokyo wrote in an email barely three weeks after the 
disaster began. 
The email captured the mood. Descriptions of Fukushima’s 
aftermath hardly lacked for incantations of the severe. With a 
decommissioning process that may take as many as three decades to 
finalize,16 portrayals of the meltdown and ensuing cleanup at this 
“campus larger than the Pentagon’s”17 as embodying a 
“remarkable,”18 “nightmare scenario”19—even “chaos . . . 
explosions, fires, ruptures”20—were not in short supply. “For nuclear 
 
 15. Letters from Fukushima: Tepco Worker Emails, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 28, 2011, 8:21 
PM), http://tinyurl.com/5skvh2l (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Early reports suggested that decommissioning would take a full decade. See, e.g., 
Krista Mahr, A Month After the Earthquake, the Crisis Continues and the Questions Mount, 
TIME, Apr. 11, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/3u3b3jd; O.M., Piecing Together Fukushima, 
ECONOMIST (May 5, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/ 
05/japans_nuclear_disaster. More recent estimates by an expert panel enlisted by Japan’s 
Atomic Energy Commission put the figure at closer to thirty years. Experts Say It Will Take at 
Least 30 Years to Close Japan’s Tsunami-Hit Nuclear Power Plant, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 
2011, http://tinyurl.com/66nzl6f. 
 17. Evan Osnos, The Fallout: Letter from Fukushima: Seven Months Later: Japan’s 
Nuclear Predicament, NEW YORKER, Oct. 17, 2011, at 46, 46.  
 18. O.M., supra note 16.  
 19. Simon Shuster, Fire at Fourth Reactor: Is Worse Yet to Come in the Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster?, TIME, Mar. 15, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 
0,8599,2059232,00.html. 
 20. Michael Grunwald, The Real Cost of U.S. Nuclear Power, TIME, Mar. 25, 2011, 
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evacuees,” one reporter wrote, “the very idea of rebuilding [the city 
and surrounding region] looks increasingly out of reach. As images 
are emerging from the deserted zone, where forgotten corpses rest in 
situ[,] . . . many evacuees are beginning to wonder when and if 
they’ll be able to return.”21 Another reporter observed: 
All that’s missing from the area is people. In their place, dogs roam 
the streets, abandoned by their owners. Alien figures in radiation 
suits, gas masks and respirators peer from passing vehicles. A police 
car slows and the two masks inside tell the Sakumas, father and son, 
to get quickly to safety. “It’s dangerous here. Please take shelter, 
for your own sake.”22  
Offering his view of the risk that Fukushima presented in the weeks 
after the three active reactors at the plant melted down,23 Robert 
Alvarez, a former U.S. Department of Energy official, was far 
blunter: “I’d get my butt on an airplane and get out of Japan.”24 
For all the quickness to employ end-of-days imagery in 
describing the scene at Fukushima, however, details of precisely what 
went wrong at the plant were slower to emerge. Initially, only one 
thing was clear: the “double whammy” of the 9.0 earthquake and 
enormous tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011 
triggered the crisis.25 The earthquake caused “the automatic 
shutdown of 11 reactors at four sites” along Japan’s northeast 
coast.26 At Fukushima Daiichi, it took the plant off the grid, cutting 
off the electric power supply for its cooling systems.27 Then, the 
tsunami disabled the semitruck-sized, diesel-fired backup generators 
 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2059603,00.html. 
 21. Mahr, supra note 16. 
 22. David McNeill, Fukushima No. 1’s Scary Shadow: Bucolic Farm Belt Now No-Go Zone 
of Radioactivity, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ 
nn20110331f1.html. 
 23. 2011 Japan Nuclear Crisis: Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, 
http://tinyurl.com/6fqn5xh [hereinafter Overview] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. Jeffrey Kluger, Fear Goes Nuclear, TIME, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,2059639,00.html. 
 25. Howard Chua-Eoan, How to Stop a Nuclear Meltdown, TIME, Mar 12, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058615,00.html. The tsunami was not a 
single wave but a “first large” wave that was “followed by multiple additional waves.” U.S. 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FACT SHEET ON SUMMARY OF MARCH 2011 JAPAN 
EVENTS AND NRC RESPONSE (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/fs-japan-events.html [hereinafter “NRC FACT SHEET”]. 
 26. NRC FACT SHEET, supra note 25. 
 27. Chua-Eoan, supra note 25; O.M., supra note 16; Overview, supra note 23. 
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that were designed to step in and keep the reactor cores cool by 
continuing water circulation.28 Fukushima was built with the 
expectation that a tsunami could strike. Yet the original estimate was 
that a 3.1-meter wave might hit; in 2002, that prediction was 
upgraded to a 5.7 meters. The March 11 tsunami was roughly 15 
meters high, flooding the backup generators located on the ground 
floor and in the basements of the plant.29 Fukushima “had been built 
with large shutters facing the sea.”30 As the tsunami arrived, 
however, water  
burst through the closed shutters and swamped the buildings. . . . 
[It] hurled pickup trucks pinwheeling end over end into delicate 
pipes and equipment, . . . swamp[ing] the campus in roiling brown 
pools, fifteen feet deep, leaving the nuclear reactors protruding like 
boulders in a river. And then it recoiled into the sea.31 
After the cooling systems stopped, the reactor cores began to 
overheat. This led to what could only be described as “surreal” sights 
at the facility: “two helicopters from the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces hover[ing] above the crippled Reactor 3[,] . . . a huge red 
bucket carrying tons of seawater swaying beneath each[,]. . . 
dumping a total of seven tons of seawater into a depleted pool of 
water housing the spent fuel rods,” while on the ground “the Self-
Defense Forces moved 11 trucks bearing water cannons into position 
to aid in the cooling effort.”32 Eventually, these “last-ditch,” “Hail 
Mary pass”33 efforts at avoiding catastrophe failed. Hydrogen gas 
became trapped inside the facilities, causing fires and explosions that 
damaged three of the main Fukushima buildings.34 A separate fire 
also occurred in Building 4, which stored spent fuel rods in a cooling 
pond.35 
 
 
 28. O.M., supra note 16; Chua-Eoan, supra note 25; Osnos, supra note 17, at 48; 
Overview, supra note 23. 
 29. O.M., supra note 16; Osnos, supra note 17, at 48. 
 30. Osnos, supra note 17, at 48. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Chua-Eoan, supra note 25. 
 34. O.M., supra note 16; Hiroko Tabuchi, Keith Bradsher, & Matthew L. Wald, In 
Japan Reactor Failings, Danger Signs for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, at A1, available 
at http://tinyurl.com/7z964tn. 
 35. O.M., supra note 16.  
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:08 PM 
1937 Beyond Fukushima 
 1943 
All this ultimately led to “not merely a double blow but a triple 
one”—a chain reaction of chain reactions that caused the worst 
nuclear energy incident in the world since Chernobyl.36 Radioactive 
gas leaked into the atmosphere, eventually being measured as far 
away as Iceland.37 It also hampered cleanup efforts. The explosions 
and fires “splattered radioactive and other debris . . . hither and 
yon,” obscuring “what the most important sources of radiation 
were.”38 
The release of radiation forced the evacuation of approximately 
86,000 people from around the facility.39 The Japanese government 
established a six-mile evacuation perimeter, a perimeter it later 
doubled based in part on information it possessed at the time it set 
the original emergency zone.40 The government’s back-and-forth on 
the appropriate disaster response incited sharp criticism. Early 
critiques deemed the Japanese government “arbitrary, unscientific, 
even callous” in how it handled the incident.41 Later criticisms were 
even more pointed, assessing the government’s performance as 
ineffective, shrouded in secrecy, and more concerned about 
“avoid[ing] responsibility and, above all, criticism” than about the 
safety of its people.42 A May 2011 poll, in fact, revealed just how 
deep-seated this distrust was; it showed that north of eighty percent 
of Japanese people “did not believe the[ir] government’s 
information” about the disaster.43 With some residents being 
evacuated to areas directly in the line of what government models 
 
 36. Id.; see also Beth Thomas, Fukushima Plant Released Record Amount of Radiation 
Into Ocean, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/10/31/bloomberg_articlesLTWZKG6KLVR4.DTL (“Tokyo 
Electric’s Fukushima station may have emitted . . . 35,800 terabecquerels of cesium 137 into 
the atmosphere at the height of the disaster . . . . The estimated amount is about 42 percent of 
that released into the atmosphere in the Chernobyl explosion in 1986 . . . .”).  
 37. Overview, supra note 23. 
 38. O.M., supra note 16. 
 39. Overview, supra note 23; Sayonara, Nukes, but Not Yet; An Anti-Nuclear Protest in 
Japan, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, at 52, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21530147. 
 40. Eric Talmadge & Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Ignored Own Radiation Forecasts, WASH. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/9/japan-
ignored-own-radiation-forecasts/?page=all.  
 41. McNeill, supra note 22. 
 42. Norimitsu Onishi & Martin Fackler, Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in 
Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/ 
09/world/asia/09japan.html?pagewanted=all. 
 43. Osnos, supra note 17, at 57–58. 
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had predicted to be the path of radiation exposure, at least one local 
official went so far as to accuse the national government of acts 
equivalent to “murder.”44 Kiwamu Ariga, an 81-year-old who at the 
end of World War II was enlisted as a child to search by hand for 
uranium for the Japanese atomic effort, certainly saw nefariousness in 
the government’s response: “We were brainwashed during the war, 
and we were brainwashed again after the war. Maybe we will get wise 
the third time.”45 
Motives aside, what was clear about the response to Fukushima’s 
demise was that confusion reigned. As evening crept on March 11, 
workers at the plant were forced to go to nearby homes to ask for 
flashlights so they could see inside the plant.46 The plant’s operators 
were unprepared. “There was hesitation, arguments and sheer 
confusion over what to do.”47 The pressure inside Reactor No. 1 
reached twice its design limit shortly after the earthquake struck. The 
government thus ordered the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power 
(“TEPCO”), to begin venting gas off the reactor, but the company 
refused, with its employees engaging in a “shouting match” over 
what course of action was most appropriate.48 As a consequence, one 
reactor meltdown began only hours after the tsunami hit.49 The 
government, meanwhile, refused to admit the extremity of the crisis. 
On the night of the tsunami, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s 
spokesperson, Yukio Edano, declared: “Let me repeat that there is 
no radiation leak, nor will there be a leak.”50 Ultimately, the 
Japanese government officially acknowledged the meltdown—but 
not until two months after it occurred.51 
Blame did not rest solely with the government, however. It cut 
multiple ways. Preparations at the plant were so poor that workers 
attempting to grapple with the initial loss of power became so 
“desperate for electricity . . . they fanned out into the parking lot to 
 
 44. Onishi & Fackler, supra note 42. 
 45. Martin Fackler, Fukushima’s Long Link to a Dark Nuclear Past, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2011, at A10 (quoting Mr. Ariga) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. Osnos, supra note 17, at 50. 
 47. Tabuchi, Bradsher, & Wald, supra note 34 (quoting an anonymous government 
advisor) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bright Ideas Needed: Japan’s Power Monopolies Raise Costs and Stifle Innovation, 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 65 [hereinafter Bright Ideas Needed]. 
 50. Osnos, supra note 17, at 48. 
 51. Bright Ideas Needed, supra note 49, at 65. 
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scavenge car batteries from any vehicles that had survived the 
wave.”52 At one point early in the crisis, Prime Minister Kan, 
frustrated with TEPCO’s withholding of information, stormed into 
the company’s headquarters, screaming, “What the hell is going 
on?”53 When Kan later flew to the facility to see what was happening 
for himself, the plant manager reportedly offered to “form a suicide 
squad” to open the vent in Reactor No. 1.54 As United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Gregory Jaczko would 
later comment about his early frustration with the Japanese 
government’s apparent refusal to share information with his agency, 
“[i]t wasn’t a question of them not providing the information to  
us . . . . The information just didn’t exist.”55 
The failure to contain Fukushima resulted in substantial 
environmental contamination. The scope of immediate fallout was so 
vast it included an area as large as Chicago.56 The most contaminated 
area, the ten miles immediately around the plant, likely will be 
uninhabitable for a century-and-a-half,57 but the “vagaries of wind 
and rain . . . scattered worrisome amounts of radioactive materials in 
unexpected patterns far outside the evacuation zone”—including 
creating radiation hotspots in Tokyo, 160 miles away.58 
Plants, crops, livestock, and water in the region all were 
contaminated with radioactive materials. Six months after the 
meltdowns, local fishermen and cattle farmers were still banned from 
selling their yields.59 Some crops were tested and cleared for 
consumption, although radiation was found in many “local foods 
like shitake mushrooms, bamboo shoots, fish, beef, and spinach,” to 
name only a few.60 The overall result was prevailing uncertainty. 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (quoting Naoto Kan) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Osnos, supra note 17, at 50. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 58. 
 57. Id. at 53. 
 58. Hiroko Tabuchi, Citizens’ Testing Finds 20 Hot Spots Around Tokyo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/world/asia/radioactive-hot-spots-
in-tokyo-point-to-wider-problems.html?pagewanted=all. 
 59. Krista Mahr, A Long Road to Recovery, TIME, Aug. 29, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2089361,00.html [hereinafter Mahr, 
A Long Road]. 
 60. Krista Mahr, Do I Dare to Eat a Peach? Fukushima Citizens and Farmers Struggle 
with Food Safety, ECOCENTRIC (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:50 AM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/ 
2011/08/08/do-i-dare-to-eat-a-peach-fukushima-citizens-and-farmers-struggle-with-food-
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“The exact amount and degree of contamination is still unknown.”61 
A half-year after the explosions at the reactors, work remained 
ongoing to strip local land of contaminated soil; at the same time, 
citizen measurements showed that three-quarters of tested schools 
exceeded the yearly limit of radiation exposure for employees at 
Japanese nuclear power plants.62 One government estimate 
suggested that nearly 2500 square kilometers of contaminated soil 
would need to be cleared—an area bigger than Tokyo itself.63 
Consequently, the region, once a “picture-postcard”64 tourist 
destination well known for its “verdant rice paddies and mountain 
hot springs,”65 a place with the “feel of Maine: organic farms, pine 
forests, coastal towns where the air is spiked with sea salt,”66 became 
home to scores of “nuclear gypsies” who traveled from across the 
country to work on the cleanup.67 As one report put it, “anyone who 
isn’t [in Fukushima] on business simply isn’t there.”68 
Ultimately, for the people of Fukushima and Japan more 
broadly, this lingering uncertainty may be the disaster’s most 
enduring legacy. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency 
confirmed that the site had become “essentially stable” six months 
after the tragedy began,69 doubts about the area’s future remain. A 
month into the disaster, the event was provisionally escalated to a 
“level seven” nuclear incident, the highest level possible.70 Half a 
 
safety/ [hereinafter Mahr, Do I Dare]; Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59. 
 61. Mahr, Do I Dare, supra note 60. 
 62. Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59. 
 63. Radiation in Japan: Hot Spots and Blind Spots: The Mounting Human Costs of 
Japan’s Nuclear Disaster, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21531522/print. 
 64. McNeill, supra note 22. 
 65. Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59. 
 66. Osnos, supra note 17, at 55. 
 67. Justin McCurry, Fukushima Cleanup Recruits ‘Nuclear Gypsies’ from Across Japan, 
GUARDIAN (July 13, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ 
2011/jul/13/fukushima-nuclear-gypsies-engineers-labourers. One report noted that many of 
these workers make the equivalent of 11 dollars per hour—”the same as part-time help at 
McDonald’s in Tokyo.” Osnos, supra note 17, at 55. 
 68. Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59. 
 69. Fredrik Dahl, Fukushima Reactors Now ‘Stable,’ IAEA Says, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 
2011, 2:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/12/us-nuclear-japan-iaea-
idUSTRE78B5D020110912. 
 70. Matt Smith, Japan Nuclear Agency Raises Threat Level, CNN (Apr. 11, 2011, 11:11 
PM), http://tinyurl.com/3tknwsb. 
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year later, “the Fukushima accident isn’t over.”71 A late 2011 report 
suggested that the disabled reactors may still be experiencing “bursts 
of fission,” releasing yet more radioactivity.72 Trying to quell fears 
that cleanup efforts were ineffective at decontaminating water at the 
site, a government official in November took the dare of a journalist, 
went on television, and drank half a glass of water collected from the 
reactor buildings.73 The Japanese government also recently 
acknowledged that over three dozen sensors within the twelve-mile-
radius evacuation zone surrounding the plant have recorded above-
acceptable radiation levels, meaning that much of the area will 
remain evacuated indefinitely—for decades at least.74 “We cannot 
deny a possibility that some of the residents may not be able to 
return to their homes for a long time,” acknowledged Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yukio Edano in an August news conference.75 “We are very 
sorry.”76 
III. THREE RESPONSES 
The destruction and devastation that Fukushima’s meltdown 
unleashed was horrific: a tragedy heaped on a tragedy and, worse 
still, an avoidable one. On this the facts are not debatable. 
Where there is controversy is on the appropriate policy response 
to the disaster. It is hardly surprising that each nation might mark its 
own particular path in determining how to deal with nuclear power 
post-Fukushima. Considering, however, the reaction of three 
countries shows just how divergent political responses to energy 
disasters can be. For Germany, the United States, and Japan, the 
reactions to Fukushima hardly could have been more different. 
 
 71. Remarks of Peter Bradford, Adjunct Professor, Vermont Law School, Nuclear 
Safety—Expecting the Unexpected, 19th Section Fall Meeting: The ABA Environment, 
Energy, and Resources Law Summit, Section of Enviroment, Energy, and Resources, Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Indianapolis, Indiana (Oct. 13, 2011) (notes in possession of author). 
 72. Hiroko Tabuchi, Fears of Fission Rise at Stricken Japanese Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/world/asia/bursts-of-fission-detected-at-
fukushima-reactor-in-japan.html?pagewanted=all. 
 73. Robert Mackey & Ravi Somaiya, Japanese Official Drinks Water from Fukushima 
Reactor Buildings, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3qzm97a. 
 74. Martin Fackler, Large Zone Near Japanese Reactors to Be Off Limits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 2011, at A6; Mari Yamaguchi, Some Areas Near Japan’s Crippled Nuke Plant to 
Remain Off-limits for Foreseeable Future, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 22, 2011. 
 75.  Yamaguchi, supra note 74 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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A. Germany 
“There is German angst about nuclear power.”77  
Germany, to be sure, long has been antipathetic to atomic 
energy, despite its making up nearly a quarter of the nation’s 
electricity production. Since at least the 1970s, smiling yellow-and-
red suns brandishing the slogan “Atomkraft? Neine, danke” have 
been cultural fixtures in Germany.78 Indeed, the left-leaning anti-
nuclear activists of the 1970s who so staunchly opposed Germany’s 
use of nuclear energy were in large part the precursors to the nation’s 
now politically powerful Green Party.79 
Still, in the months leading up to Fukushima’s failure, nuclear 
energy appeared to have at least some staying power in Germany. In 
late 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel brokered a deal to 
extend the lives of the nation’s seventeen active nuclear power plants 
by twelve years.80 The plan, which Merkel called a “revolution in 
energy provision”81 to keep nuclear “desirable as a bridging 
technology”82 was not without controversy, but it also was seen as a 
way to help cement Germany’s position as an economic and 
environmental leader. The environmental aspect was obvious given 
Germany’s growing renewables sector83 and nuclear’s own climate 
 
 77. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Germany Dims Nuclear Plants, but Hopes to Keep Lights On, 
N.Y TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/science/earth/ 
30germany.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Hildegard Cornelius-Guas) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 78. Sabine Rennefanz, Merkel Spins Round to Lead Germany’s Anti-nuclear Movement, 
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2011, 11:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/ 
jun/01/angela-merkel-germany-nuclear-power. This German phrase translates to “Nuclear 
power? No, thank you.” See Paul Hockenos, Atomkraft? Neine Danke!, PROGRESSIVE (August 
2011), http://progressive.org/atomkraft_nein_nuclear_power.html. 
 79. Daniel Johnson, Why Germany Said No to Nuclear Power, TELEGRAPH (May 30, 
2011, 8:37 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/ 
8546608/Why-Germany-said-no-to-nuclear-power.html. 
 80. Kate Connolly, Germany Agrees to Extend Life of Nuclear Power Stations, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2010, 9:59 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/06/ 
germany-extend-nuclear-power-stations. 
 81.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Kate Connolly, Angela Merkel Risks Germans’ Ire with Fresh Commitment to Nuclear 
Energy, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ 
aug/30/angela-merkel-commits-nuclear-energy (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. See, e.g., Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and 
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1859 
(2008); Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models: 
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change benefits.84 Likewise, many suggested that the decision to 
keep nuclear power running put nothing less than Germany’s energy 
independence on the line: “We urgently need to keep the plants up 
and running for longer,” Merkel said.85 “I am against shutting down 
our nuclear power plants only to have atomic power imported into 
Germany from other countries. . . . That won’t happen on my 
watch.”86 
How much can change in a day. In Fukushima’s wake, anti-
nuclear sentiment in Germany surged to all-time highs, and 
Chancellor Merkel swiftly caved to the pressure. Not weeks or 
months but mere days after the tsunami struck Japan, Merkel 
announced that the government would order the shutdown of 
Germany’s seven nuclear power plants built before 1980.87 Then, in 
yet a further blow to the industry, the German government 
announced that it would phase out its remaining ten reactors, so that 
after 2022 no nuclear power plant would operate in Germany.88 
“Safety has the priority in all our deliberations,” Merkel declared.89 
Norbert Röttgen, Merkel’s environment minister, was even starker. 
“It’s definite: the latest end for the last three nuclear power plants is 
2022. . . . There will be no clause for revision.”90 
Together, these two decisions made Germany’s the harshest of 
reactions to Fukushima Daiichi. In the span of a decade, this heavily 
industrialized nation planned to transform its electric economy, 
eliminating nearly a quarter of its generation supply and using 
 
Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 955, 956–60 (2010); Marc 
Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: The Race Between Feed-
in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 11 (2006). 
 84. See, e.g., RONALD E. HAGEN ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, IMPACT OF U.S. 
NUCLEAR GENERATION ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 5 (Nov. 1, 2001) (reporting zero 
CO2 emissions during the operation of a nuclear plant compared to 0.266 metric tons/MWh 
for coal), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/-nuclear/ghg.pdf . 
 85. Charles Lane, Merkel’s Flip-flop Logic, WASH. POST (June 7, 2011, 4:05 PM), 
http://tinyurl.com/7g6np6t (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Johnson, supra note 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87. Luke Harding, Angela Merkel Switches Off Seven Nuclear Power Plants, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 15, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/15/germany-
merkel-switches-nuclear-power-off. 
 88. Germany Pledges Nuclear Shutdown by 2022, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2011, 5:24 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/30/germany-pledges-nuclear-shutdown-
2022. 
 89. Harding, supra note 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Germany Pledges Nuclear Shutdown by 2022, supra note 88 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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massive expansion of renewables, new coal- and gas-fired plants, and 
aggressive efficiency measures to make up the gap. This perhaps was 
not entirely because of Fukushima, but there also was no denying 
that the change was a direct, proximate result of the meltdown of a 
single power plant on the other side of the globe. 
The German decision was met with great domestic fanfare. 
Whereas a poll showed fifty-six percent of Germans opposing the 
extension of nuclear plants’ lives in 2010,91 the phaseout-by-2022 
proposal rushed through the German legislature: eighty-five percent 
of parliamentarians supported the move,92 and the vote in the lower 
house was an overwhelming 513-79.93 
Choosing to shut down nuclear power in Germany, however, did 
not go entirely without dissent. Many in the international 
community—and a vociferous minority at home, too—blasted 
Merkel for what in the United States would have been labeled a clear 
political “flip flop.”94 “Yes, this lady is for turning! For spinning, 
indeed,” wrote the United Kingdom’s Guardian.95 Others likewise 
noted the irony of this nuclear “turnaround,”96 calling it, among 
other things, “emotional,”97 “a spectacular about-turn,”98 “a drastic 
policy reversal,”99 “politically motivated [for] tactical reasons 
alone,”100 “[b]acktracking in the blink of an eye,”101 and a measure 
that would force an “extreme energy makeover” for the entire 
nation.102 Hans-Jürgen Papier, former president of Germany’s 
Federal Constitutional Court, cut to the quick: “Angela Merkel, the 
 
 91. Connolly, supra note 82. 
 92. How Germany Plans to Succeed in a Nuclear Free, Low-Carbon Economy, GUARDIAN 
(July 29, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/29/ 
nuclearpower-energy. 
 93. Germany Votes to End Nuclear Power by 2022, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2011, 2:16 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/30/germany-end-nuclear-power-2022. 
 94. Lane, supra note 85 (calling Merkel’s changed decision “one of the most blatant 
political flip-flops of all time”). 
 95. Rennefanz, supra note 78. 
 96. Judy Dempsey, Siemens Abandoning Nuclear Power Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/business/global/19iht-siemens19.html. 
 97. Rosenthal, supra note 77. 
 98. Germany Votes to End Nuclear Power by 2022, supra note 93. 
 99. Germany Pledges Nuclear Shutdown by 2022, supra note 88. 
 100.  Thomas Schmid, The Hidden Fallout from Germany’s Sudden Nuclear Shutdown, 
TIME, June 2, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075013,00.html. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Rosenthal, supra note 77. 
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magician, pulled [this moratorium] out of her hat like a rabbit a 
couple of days after Fukushima.”103 
“Germany, in a very rash decision, decided to experiment on 
ourselves,” Jürgen Grossmann, chief executive of one of Germany’s 
largest electricity suppliers, RWE, later said of the ban. “The politics 
are overruling the technical arguments.”104 Early on, there appeared 
to be at least some truth in this statement. The other German 
electricity giant, and Europe’s largest power provider, E.ON, 
announced it would slash up to 11,000 jobs and post earnings in the 
red as a result of the phaseout.105 Chemical powerhouse Bayer 
threatened to relocate production facilities outside the country.106 
German manufacturing conglomerate Siemens declared it would no 
longer produce nuclear facilities, despite having built all seventeen of 
Germany’s.107 Moreover, with such a large swath of plants already off 
the grid, threats of winter blackouts loomed.108 And a leading 
German bank estimated that the switch from nuclear to renewables 
would cost the nation $340 billion over the next decade.109 
All this was the case, and perhaps to little avail: since the 
shutdown of the seven oldest plants, Germany has met its electricity 
demand most days only by importing power from France and the 
Czech Republic—both heavy users of nuclear power.110 Still, in 
Germany, the answer to Fukushima remained clear: a “death warrant 
on nuclear power.”111 
 
 103. Schmid, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Rosenthal, supra note 77 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. Tom Bawden, German Nuclear Shutdown Forces E.ON to Cut 11,000 Staff, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/ 
10/german-nuclear-shutdown-forces-eon-to-axe-11000-jobs. 
 106. Ruby Russell, Bayer Threatens to Quit Germany over Nuclear Shutdown, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 7, 2011, 1:36 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/07/bayer-quit-
germany-nuclear-shutdown. 
 107. Dempsey, supra note 96. 
 108. Germany Could Restart Nuclear Plant to Plug Energy Gap, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L 
(July 13, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,774203,00.html 
[hereinafter Germany Could Restart]. 
 109. Nuclear Phaseout to Cost Germany 250 Billion, THE LOCAL (Sept. 19, 2011, 
4:05 PM), http://www.thelocal.de/money/20110919-37687.html. 
 110. Germany May Be Importing Nuclear Power to Meet Energy Needs, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INT’L (Apr. 4, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3mlka5h. 
 111. Schmid, supra note 100. 
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B. United States 
To Germany’s anti-nuclear fervor, the United States matched 
caution and deliberateness—a measured, adjust-if-necessary but 
change-as-little-as-possible approach. 
For a nation whose views on atomic energy have cycled in 
polarity over time—thus keeping the American energy stance firmly 
in the middle of the nuclear road112—this incrementalist response 
hardly should have been a surprise. “Support for nuclear power [in 
the United States] has waxed and waned over the decades, going up 
as the power-hungry nation looked for ways to meet demand and 
driven down by nuclear accidents at home and abroad.”113 With 
Fukushima Daiichi, little changed. 
U.S. leaders were quick to express concern and condolences for 
Japan and to offer support, including sending teams of experts from 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) to assist the Japanese 
government.114 But on nuclear power itself, the official policy 
remained: steady as she goes. Mere days after the tragedy in Japan 
began unfolding, President Obama reiterated America’s commitment 
to nuclear power as part of our generation mix. “[N]uclear power,” 
he said, was still “an important part of our own energy future.”115 In 
testimony before Congress, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu echoed 
this view: “That position hasn’t been changed.”116 “To meet our 
energy needs . . . the administration believes we must rely on a 
diverse set of energy sources including renewables like wind and 
solar, natural gas, clean coal and nuclear power.”117 
 
 112. See Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Amy Bonaccorso, The NRC Continues to Support Japan’s Recovery Efforts, NRC 
BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011), http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/08/01/the-nrc-continues-
to-support-japans-recovery-efforts/. 
 115. Jesse Lee, President Obama: “We Will Stand with the People of Japan,” WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/17/ 
president-obama-we-will-stand-people-japan (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jia 
Lynn Yang, Democrats Step Up Pressure on Nuclear Regulators over Disaster Preparedness, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/18/AR2011031800115_pf.html. 
 116. Peter Wallsten & Dan Eggen, U.S. Takes Conservative Approach in Response to 
Nuclear Crisis in Japan, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/6rn8r9s (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Joshua Green, Washington’s Pro-Nuke Consensus, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2011, 
10:54 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/03/washingtons-pro-nuke-
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 Instead, what the Obama administration called for was a careful 
review of Fukushima’s implications for nuclear energy in the United 
States.118 Yet this review was much more circumscribed than it might 
have been. Given the administration’s continuing commitment to 
atomic energy, big picture questions were off the table. The review 
most certainly was not one—as in Germany—of whether reliance on 
nuclear power should continue, but rather a much narrower version: 
an in-the-weeds inquiry of what specific triggers led to the 
meltdowns in Fukushima, whether those same triggers existed in the 
United States, and, if so, what should be done to make American 
plants operate more safely. “[W]hen we see a crisis like the one in 
Japan,” President Obama announced, “we have a responsibility to 
learn from this event, and to draw from those lessons to ensure the 
safety and security of our people. That’s why I’ve asked the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to do a comprehensive review of the safety 
of our domestic nuclear plants in light of [Fukushima].”119 
The NRC’s review, in turn, was singularly focused on this 
concept: safety. On Capitol Hill, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko 
repeatedly reassured Congress of the safety of America’s nuclear 
generation fleet. “[W]e have been very closely monitoring the 
activities in Japan and reviewing all currently available information. 
Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection 
and licensing oversight, gives us confidence that the U.S. plants 
continue to operate safely.”120 Chairman Jaczko also clarified that the 
NRC’s post-Fukushima assessment would, consistent with the 
agency’s duties, center on the question of operational safety. “The 
NRC is systematically and methodically evaluating the lessons being 
learned at Fukushima Daiichi as they might apply to the safety of 
reactors in the United States . . . .”121 
The NRC decided to assess Fukushima’s implications in tiers, 
starting with an immediate short-term review, followed by a more in-
 
consensus/72577/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118. Lee, supra note 115. 
 119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Written Statement from Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, to Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Energy & Water, U.S. Senate 3 (Mar. 30, 
2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/6vo7gby. 
 121. Written Statement from Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, to Env’t & Pub. Works Comm. and Clean Air & Nuclear Safety Subcomm., U.S. 
Senate 3 (June 16, 2011), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/congress-docs/congress-testimony/2011/ML11166A256.pdf. 
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depth review on a slightly longer timetable, and concluding with a 
long-term review once Japan’s own assessment of what happened at 
the Daiichi plant was complete. The agency’s middle-term review 
culminated in a nearly 100-page report from a task force of six 
experts with a combined total of over 135 years of regulatory 
experience.122 Their primary conclusion confirmed what both 
President Obama and Chairman Jaczko said all along—that while 
Fukushima might lead to some reforms of U.S. nuclear regulation, 
overall the disaster gave no reason to reconsider domestic reliance on 
the technology.  
The Task Force finds that the Commission’s longstanding defense-
in-depth philosophy, supported and modified as necessary by state-
of-the-art probabilistic risk assessment techniques, should continue 
to serve as the primary organizing principle of its regulatory 
framework. . . . [Nevertheless,] a sequence of events like the 
Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and 
some appropriate mitigation measures have been implemented, 
reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. 
Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities 
do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety.123 
Specifically, the task force recommended twelve overarching 
changes to U.S. nuclear regulation.124 None, however, contemplated 
closing down plants or halting new construction. Instead, the 
recommendations emphasized ways to “clarify” and “strengthen” 
existing policy, not replace it.125 Virtually every one of the 
suggestions, moreover, was tethered directly to the problems 
encountered at Fukushima, rather than asking more broadly if gaps 
in NRC regulations existed in general. For instance, the task force 
recommended that nuclear operators “reevaluate and upgrade as 
necessary [the facilities’] seismic and flooding protection of 
structures.”126 Similarly, it urged the strengthening of “station 
 
 122. Written Statement from Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, to Env’t & Pub. Works Comm. and Clean Air & Nuclear Safety Subcomm., U.S. 
Senate 2 (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ 
ML11213A279.pdf. 
 123. CHARLES MILLER ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY vii–viii (2011), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ 
docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf. 
 124. Id. at ix. 
 125. Id. at vii. 
 126. Id. at ix. 
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blackout mitigation capability,” requiring “reliable hardened vent 
designs” in plants with the same reactor designs as Fukushima 
Daiichi’s, and pursuing “additional emergency preparedness topics 
related to multiunit events and prolonged station blackout.”127 
These political and regulatory assurances notwithstanding, 
support for nuclear power in the United States post-Fukushima was 
hardly unanimous. A number of environmental groups seized on the 
incident as an opportunity to call for the phaseout of atomic 
energy.128 Public support for the technology receded to the lowest it 
had been since Three Mile Island, dropping nearly fifteen percentage 
points from its almost sixty percent approval rating in 2008.129 And 
at least some politicians saw in Fukushima Daiichi’s demise new 
fraying around the edges of the future of American nuclear power. 
Particularly in seismically prone California, some Democrats, such as 
Henry Waxman and Barbara Boxer, expressed renewed reservations 
about the energy source. “Japan is a technologically capable country, 
and they anticipated earthquakes and tsunamis, but still they didn’t 
have all the failsafes to stop this tragedy from occurring,” 
Representative Waxman noted. “So, we need a full inquiry as to how 
this happened, why it happened, what we can do to build in security 
features in the United States. Until that happens, we ought to step 
back from the direction that Republicans are taking, which is heavily 
reliant on nuclear.”130 
 
 
 127. Id. Hardened vents allow for the release of gases from inside the reactor 
containment in the case of emergency, such as the loss of power. Plants in the United States 
using the same containment structure as that in Fukushima, the GE Mark I, installed hardened 
vents in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Daiichi plant also had hardened vents installed; 
one aspect of the investigation into the accident is to assess whether these vents performed 
sufficiently. See Venting Systems in Mark I Reactors, GE REPORTS (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.gereports.com/venting-systems-in-mark-i-reactors/; see also MILLER ET AL., 
supra note 123, at 40–41. 
 128. See Kaufman, supra note 8; The Nuclear Crisis in Japan, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 
http://www.foe.org/nuclear-crisis-japan (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); see also Eileen 
O’Grady & Scott DiSavino, Groups Step Up Call for NRC Delay After Fukushima, REUTERS 
(Aug. 11, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/11/us-utilities-
nuclear-idUSTRE77A2N720110811. 
 129. Cooper & Sussman, supra note 112; see also Matthew L. Wald, Staying the Course, 
Post-Fukushima, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/ 
10/staying-the-course-post-fukushima/. 
 130. Jessica Rettig, Japan’s Nuclear Crisis Reignites Safety Debate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Mar. 21, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/03/21/japans-nuclear-
crisis-reignites-safety-debate (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Despite such doubts, the overall approach to nuclear power in 
the United States remains largely unchanged in Fukushima’s 
aftermath. Spurred by the need for action on climate change, calls 
for expanded nuclear capacity in the United States had been growing 
for years. After Fukushima the calls did not disappear, but the 
possibility that they would bear any fruit seemed increasingly 
improbable. At the same time, nuclear was hardly going away. 
“Without nuclear power,” Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander 
argued, “it is hard to imagine how the United States could produce 
enough cheap, reliable, clean electricity to keep our economy 
moving.”131 Prognosticating about nuclear power’s future, Professor 
Robert Shrum perhaps put it most aptly: “This is not the end of 
nuclear power but the end of the fantasy that a nuclear deus ex 
machina can redeem our energy economy from dependence on 
foreign oil.”132 
Steady as she goes, indeed. 
C. Japan 
If the German and American reactions to Fukushima were, 
respectively, an about-face and a slight nudge toward more caution, 
the Japanese response was one of reconsideration and reassessment. 
Somewhat ironically, this path of careful weighing and planning 
came about at least in part as a result of the sharp seesaw of Japanese 
politics. 
Japan’s initial reaction to Fukushima in many ways mirrored 
Germany’s vitriol. After the accident, the Japanese public solidly 
disfavored the energy source. One newspaper poll showed seventy-
four percent of Japanese supporting the phaseout of nuclear power 
post-Fukushima, while another sixty percent expressed little or no 
confidence in the safety of the technology.133 For a nation that long  
 
 
 131. Green, supra note 117 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132. Steven F. Hayward, After Japan’s Disaster, Will Nuclear Energy Have a Future in 
America?, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/7antox3 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Professor Peter Bradford put it even more bluntly: “One can say that 
Fukushima is making absolutely no difference in [the] picture. The ‘nuclear renaissance’ in 
America was taking on almost every feature of a collapsing bubble even before March 11.” 
Bradford, supra note 71. 
 133. Peter Drysdale, Japan’s Energy Options After Fukushima, E. ASIA F. (Sept. 5, 2011), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energy-options-after-fukushima/. 
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had relied on nuclear energy as a chief source of electricity, this 
represented a “profound reversal of [public] sentiment.”134 
It was this newfound public opposition to nuclear power that, in 
part, spurred then-Prime Minister Kan to announce in Fukushima’s 
wake that the nation would move away from—and ultimately 
eliminate—its use of nuclear power.135 This, too, was a sharp turn for 
national policy. Less than a year before the tsunami struck, Japan had 
approved a “Basic Energy Plan” that anticipated the construction of 
fourteen new reactors, representing an increase in reliance on nuclear 
energy from thirty to fifty percent by 2030.136 Yet after Fukushima, 
Kan suggested that the nation must “start from scratch” on a new 
energy policy, because nuclear energy no longer had a place in 
Japan’s energy mix.137 This announcement, however, came as a 
surprise, leading some officials on Kan’s cabinet to express 
disagreement with the Prime Minister’s position.138 Ultimately, Kan 
was forced to clarify that his announcement of a nuclear phaseout 
was a “personal” preference, not an official governmental policy.139 
Meanwhile, other reactors across the country were shut down so 
they could undergo stress tests to ensure their safety post-
Fukushima. Combined with those facilities already undergoing 
regularly scheduled maintenance, this left only twelve of Japan’s fifty-
four nuclear power plants in operation.140 
To make up for this gap in power production, the Japanese 
government instituted setsuden, or energy conservation measures, 
throughout the summer. Industrial production schedules were 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id.; Peter Fairley, Japan Faces Post-Fukushima Power Struggle, IEEE SPECTRUM 
(Aug. 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/solar/japan-faces-postfukushima-power-
struggle. 
 137. Drysdale, supra note 133 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. See Kan’s Nuclear Phase-out Plan Draws Anger over Lack of Details, Talks, ASAHI 
SHIMBUN (July 14, 2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/ 
AJ201107144468; Kan Says Call to End Nuclear Power Was Only a Personal View, ASAHI 
SHIMBUN (July 15, 2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/ 
AJ201107154682. 
 139. Fukushima to Scrap Nuclear Plants, JAPAN TIMES, July 16, 2011, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110716a4.html. 
 140. Drysdale, supra note 133; see also Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Courts the Money in 
Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/6nwfnch (“Only about one in five 
of Japan’s 54 reactors . . . is still in service. The rest were damaged by the tsunami, are still 
being put through routine tests, or have not been restarted after such tests because of local 
opposition.”). 
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shifted from weekdays to nights and weekends. Families voluntarily 
unplugged their heated toilet seats and limited air conditioner use. 
And large businesses were required to cut electricity consumption by 
fifteen percent.141 As a consequence, Tokyo’s peak electricity 
consumption fell from sixty gigawatts (“GW”) the year before to 
forty-nine GW in the summer of 2011.142 Combined with the good 
fortune of a relatively cool summer, this meant that blackouts, which 
had been widely expected, never occurred.143 
As the summer waned, however, the public’s continued 
displeasure with the Japanese government, including its response to 
Fukushima, mounted, and Prime Minister Kan resigned. It did not 
take long for the government to shift course again. Kan’s 
replacement, Yoshihiko Noda, announced, in his first speech to the 
nation as Prime Minister, a more nuanced approach to nuclear 
energy than the one previously proposed by Kan. Noda suggested 
that no new nuclear facilities would be built, but that existing plants 
would continue to be utilized. Moreover, long-term Japanese use of 
nuclear power would be reduced—but not eliminated altogether. 
“To build new reactors is unrealistic,” Noda said, “and we will 
decommission reactors at the end of their life spans. . . . But it is also 
impossible to immediately reduce our dependence to zero.”144 As for 
the dozens of reactors that had been offline since the crisis in 
Fukushima, Noda noted that they would be restarted, but only after 
their safe operation was assured. “We will move ahead with restarting 
those nuclear plants whose safety has been thoroughly checked and 
confirmed, and with the condition that a relationship of trust is built 
with the local communities.”145 
 
 141. Bright Ideas Needed, supra note 49, at 65; Joshua Meltzer, After Fukushima: What’s 
Next for Japan’s Energy and Climate Change Policy? 2 (Sept. 7, 2011) (unpublished paper), 
available at http://tinyurl.com/ 7jy7uww. For more on setsuden, see, for example, Suvendrini 
Kakuchi, Energy-Saving ‘Setsuden’ Campaign Sweeps Japan After Fukushima, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
22, 2011, 7:24 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/22/energy-
saving-setsuden-japan-fukushima; Yoree Koh, Summer’s Over: ‘Setsuden’ Summer, That Is, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/09/13/summers-
over-setsuden-summer-that-is/.  
 142. Bright Ideas Needed, supra note 49, at 65. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Leader to Keep Nuclear Phase-Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 
2011, http://tinyurl.com/877ksrv (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145. Idled Nuclear Plants Will Be Restarted: Noda, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, at 5, 
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2011/09/14/2003513256 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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This time around, the Prime Minister’s stated policy was echoed, 
not undermined, by cabinet officials. The new Environment 
Minister, Goshi Hosono, who is also responsible for overseeing the 
cleanup and compensation effort surrounding Fukushima, reiterated 
the policy of restarting existing power plants, albeit cautiously. “I’ve 
been suspicious of the nuclear policy we have had, especially after 
March 11. I don’t intend to allow the reactors to be restarted one 
after another. I’m going to step on the brakes.”146 Hosono also 
urged creation of a new agency under the rubric of Japan’s 
Environment Ministry to regulate the nuclear industry, as opposed 
to the extant model of using an agency within the nation’s Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is responsible for promoting 
nuclear power, to do the job.147 
Even more critically, Hosono suggested that the nation’s energy 
plan would need to be revised to reflect a reevaluation of nuclear 
power’s appropriateness. “We will have discussions at various levels 
and come up with the best mix of energy sources (to ensure a stable 
supply),” Hosono said. “How much we will reduce the use of 
nuclear power and when we will do so are among the issues that will 
be discussed.”148 Prime Minister Noda likewise sounded this refrain, 
noting that in the aftermath of Fukushima it is important for the 
Japanese government to retreat, reassess, and only then decide the 
best course for the future: “There will be a continuing necessity to 
secure nuclear energy that is safe and more reliable. . . . We will 
release a best energy mix shortly.”149 
IV. ENERGY LAW: ONE METAPHOR, TWO CONCEPTIONS 
Taken together, the German, American, and Japanese responses 
to Fukushima convey a sense of how governments react to energy 
 
 146. Setsuko Kamiya, Hosono to Reshape Nuclear Policy, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110913f1.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Id.; see also Osnos, supra note 17, at 54 (discussing agency capture of the trade 
ministry by the Japanese electric and nuclear industries); Hiroko Tabuchi, Cooling Problem 
Shuts Nuclear Reactor in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/05/world/asia/cooling-problem-shuts-nuclear-reactor-in-japan.html (noting that 
the governor of the prefecture of Saga “rescinded his permission” to restart two reactors there 
post-Fukushima when it was discovered that “Kyushu Electric had tried to manipulate public 
opinion with fake e-mails to support” the reactors’ reopening). 
 148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Noda to Stress Need for Nuclear Plants at U.N., JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110919x3.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disasters—of how energy law is shaped by, or is resilient to change 
from, the calamities that reveal the end results of an energy policy’s 
aims. In these responses and others before them, concerns about 
environmental and public health risks play a role. That role, however, 
is not a leading one. It is at best a supporting role, sometimes even a 
bit part, a part that ultimately succumbs to energy law’s bigger, 
overarching objectives. For at its core, United States energy policy is 
not about environmental protection and public health. 
Fundamentally, American energy law is about providing a stable 
supply of energy, in an abundant amount and at the lowest price 
possible.150 
Energy disasters offer a chance to reevaluate energy law’s 
prevailing goals. By showing the negative, calamitous consequences 
that pursuing those goals can lead to, disasters might make us as a 
society pause and reflect on whether, in light of events like 
Fukushima, Deepwater Horizon, the Upper Big Branch Mine, or the 
Exxon Valdez, the current course of our energy policy is the right 
one.151 As Professor Zygmunt Plater aptly observed in the context of 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
The question for national energy law and policy now is whether, 
this time around, we will acknowledge and implement the lessons 
for hard systemic change largely avoided two decades ago. There 
are many promising areas for reform, . . . [but the] Deepwater 
Horizon tragedy will be a doubly disastrous occasion if it does not 
produce systemic changes for the future, as the Exxon Valdez spill 
markedly failed to do. As White House Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emanuel said in another context, “You never want a serious crisis 
to go to waste.”152 
 
 
 150. Again, nuclear power is a perfect example of this, as it was promoted, at least 
symbolically, as “too cheap to meter.” Abundant Power from Atom Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
1954, at 5 (quoting Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Comm’n, Address at the 
Twentieth Anniversary of the National Association of Science Writers (Sept. 16, 1954)). 
 151. Cf. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 91, 113 (2011) (“In times of catastrophe, political discourse is much more likely to take 
a punitive tone. . . . But thankfully, environmental disasters—at least of the sort that dominate 
headlines—are uncommon. Lesser environmental crises, of the sort that are constantly 
unfolding all around us, tend not to produce policy outcomes of this punitive variety.”). 
 152. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico . . . and the 
Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 391, 396 
(2011). 
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Contrary to this possibility of transformation, however, energy 
disasters in the United States generally have not caused the kind of 
reflection and drastic course correction Professor Plater advocates. 
True, events like Love Canal, Three Mile Island, and the burning of 
the Cuyahoga River helped galvanize the environmental 
movement—symbolically at least153—in turn playing a role in 
environmental law’s “republican moment” of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.154 Environmental law long has held disasters out as 
talismans for action, change, and legal revolution. Overall, however, 
energy disasters have tended to produce results much like what 
Fukushima appears poised to yield: incremental ones. The Exxon 
Valdez disaster helped tighten liability for oil spills, but it did not 
lessen our dependence on oil.155 The events following the explosion 
of Deepwater Horizon caused President Obama to halt offshore 
drilling, but in the face of intense political pressure, that ban too 
quickly faded.156 
Focusing on disasters to shift the law’s broad sweep, moreover, 
can be dangerous. The constant need for an unending supply of 
disasters makes more troubling but less obvious problems appear less 
critical than they actually are. Requiring everything to sound in 
disaster in order to garner attention risks diluting the truth of when 
legal change is actually needed, especially if purported “disasters” 
 
 153. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of 
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 91 (2002). 
 154. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental 
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212 (2001). 
 155. See, e.g., Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After 
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2009); Jules Lobel & George 
Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in Foreign Policy and 
International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1075 (2005) (“The Exxon Valdez oil spill     
. . . was one of the worst environmental disasters in American history, inciting a nationwide 
public protest, a massive volunteer effort to assist in clean up, and the passage of the Oil 
Pollution Act . . . .”); Noël Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending 
the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 
21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 330 (2002) (“Congress swiftly enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 in response to the massive spill of approximately eleven million gallons of oil into 
Alaska’s Prince William Sound from the Exxon Valdez, which has been widely viewed as one of 
the worst environmental disasters in history.”). 
 156. Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to 
Be a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2010); Peter Baker & John M. Broder, White House 
Lifts Ban on Deepwater Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/us/13drill.html. 
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turn out not to be. And overemphasizing disasters gambles with 
energy policy’s future—pushing the law in ways that are neither 
optimal nor efficient, in directions attuned more to the flashy than 
the essential. As Professor Jim Rossi has astutely observed, 
“Legislation in reaction to a crisis . . . does not guarantee the public 
a comprehensive, sound, and sustainable energy policy.”157 
This is as true for nuclear energy policy as it is for other areas of 
energy law, despite the enormous risks that the use of atomic power 
presents. It can be seen, indeed, in how the United States, Japan, 
and even Germany responded to Fukushima’s demise. 
U.S. regulators, as noted, seized on improving safety post-
Fukushima—specifically, to avoid the exact problems that TEPCO 
encountered and their possible corollaries in U.S. plants.158 The 
NRC task force’s recommendations, for instance, urged regulations 
to account for a prolonged total loss of station power at nuclear 
facilities, to anticipate the possibility of multiple natural disaster 
events, and to assure that there will not be venting problems with 
the reactor type used both in Daiichi and here in the United States, 
the GE Mark I.159 These recommendations said nothing about what 
nuclear power’s role in the United States should be after Fukushima. 
Even in the face of a tragedy as horrific as this, U.S. regulators and 
policymakers appear to have followed the traditional American path 
for responding to disasters. They have resisted the temptation to 
make big, long-lasting changes in response to a high profile event. 
The Japanese response revealed a similar paradigm, though 
perhaps somewhat less pointedly. Attempting a Merkel-like 
maneuver to use an anti-nuclear stance to preserve his own political 
power, Prime Minister Kan declared the end of atomic energy in 
Japan after Fukushima.160 Yet this did not last. Kan was ousted, and 
his successor took a far more measured approach. Nuclear utilization 
may not grow in Japan, new Prime Minister Noda acknowledged, 
but it was not going away either.161 For a heavily populated island 
 
 157. Jim Rossi, Lessons from the Procedural Politics of the “Comprehensive” National 
Energy Policy Act of 1992, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 195, 239 (1995). 
 158. See supra Part III.B. Perhaps this should not be surprising. It is not uncommon, 
after all, that a “big accident becomes a laboratory for studying how to prevent the next one.” 
Osnos, supra note 17, at 52. 
 159. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra Part III.C. 
 161. See supra Part III.C. 
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nation lacking sufficient indigenous energy resources, nuclear power 
simply plays too important a role in electricity supply to just recede 
away. 
Even in Germany’s anti-nuclear response, some resistance to 
transforming the law’s path in reaction to a single event came 
through. True, the German government seized on Fukushima as a 
chance to eliminate nuclear power from the scene,162 but that was 
hardly the end of the story. Germany was able to make this choice 
only because of its surging renewable energy production163 and 
because, prior to making the decision, it boasted substantial excess 
generation capacity that it exported to other parts of Europe.164 With 
the nuclear ban in place, those exports went away; blackouts became 
a real threat that could not just be brushed aside; huge infrastructure 
investments became immediately necessary; and stopgap measures to 
bide time—including relying on nuclear power from other nations—
became unavoidable.165 Germany was willing to make this gamble, 
but there were no illusions that it was not rolling the dice. 
What explains the heavy resistance to fundamentally altering the 
law in response to headline-grabbing energy disasters? There is a 
common thread running through each of these nation’s reactions to 
Fukushima: the critical role that supply stability, its abundance, and 
economic performance play in energy policy. To a large degree, this 
is why the United States, with nuclear energy constituting nearly 
twenty percent of its generating portfolio,166 did not meaningfully 
weigh phasing nuclear energy out. It is why in Japan, with a thirty 
percent nuclear electric fleet,167 Prime Minister Noda so quickly 
reversed Prime Minister Kan’s stance. It is why in Germany Jürgen 
Grossmann called the nation’s nuclear ban an “experiment on 
ourselves.”168 
 
 162. See supra Part III.A. 
 163. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Helen Pidd, Germany to Shut All Nuclear Reactors, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2011, 
2:18 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/30/germany-to-shut-nuclear-
reactors. 
 165. See Germany Could Restart, supra note 108; supra text accompanying note 110. 
 166. Energy Info. Admin, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Electricity in the United States, 
EIA.GOV (July 21, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3lyuzsa. 
 167. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Premier Wants Shift Away from Nuclear Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2011, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/ 
14japan.html. 
 168. Rosenthal, supra note 77, at A1. 
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These three nations’ respective responses to Fukushima thus 
expose a larger truth about energy law and policy itself. They do so 
through the perspective of nuclear energy. Admittedly, the atomic 
lens yields a distorted image. It is skewed by numerous factors that 
are not present, or are not nearly as prominent, in other energy 
realms.169 Nevertheless, the nuclear view of energy policy lays bare a 
dominant trait of virtually every aspect of U.S. energy law: assuring 
energy supplies, as an overarching objective of energy policy, tends 
to reign. Even in disasters as dramatic as Fukushima, with the world 
watching on live television as one percent of the global nuclear 
 
 169. Nuclear power, for instance, packs heavy historical baggage. Its use conjures heavily 
symbolic images of its origins: flashing explosions in the dead night of the American West’s 
deserts, downwinders and Native Americans burdened by those tests and the extraction of 
uranium for them, and mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See generally, e.g., 
MICHAEL A. AMUNDSON, YELLOWCAKE TOWNS: URAINUM MINING COMMUNITIES IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST (2002); STEPHANIE COOKE, IN MORTAL HANDS: A CAUTIONARY HISTORY 
OF THE NUCLEAR AGE (2009); THE ATOMIC WEST (Bruce Hevly & John M. Findlay eds., 
1998); CHIP WARD, CANARIES ON THE RIM: LIVING DOWNWIND IN THE WEST (1999); John 
M. Findlay, The Nuclear West: National Programs and Regional Continuity Since 1942, 24 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (2004); Don Hancock, The Nuclear West: Which Road to the 
Future?, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 29 (2004). As Fukushima itself makes clear, 
nuclear power also presents environmental and health risks on a scale unimaginable for other 
energy sources. And nuclear’s silence and invisibility complicate the picture: neighbors of a coal 
plant may not know what precisely the smoke billowing from the facility will do to their health, 
but they can see it. Radiation cannot be comprehended in the same way. See generally SPENCER 
R. WEART, NUCLEAR FEAR (1988). See also Jorge Contreras, In the Village Square: Risk 
Misperception and Decisionmaking in the Regulation of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 19 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 500–03 (1992) (noting fear of radioactivity generally); Amanda Leiter, 
The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and the Nuclear Power 
Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 48–63 (2008) (assessing the role that risk perception might 
play on the utilization of nuclear energy technology). At the same time, nuclear power also 
lacks, or lacks in pertinence, concerns critical for other energy sources. Despite its potentially 
catastrophic consequences, the nuclear industry boasts a safety record that is the envy of other 
energy producers. E.g., JOHN M. DEUTCH ET AL., UPDATE OF THE MIT 2003 FUTURE OF 
NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 10 (2009), http://web.mit.edu/ 
nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR ENERGY 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP vi (2010), http://nuclear.gov/pdfFiles/ 
NuclearEnergy_Roadmap_Final.pdf. It has a smaller land consumption footprint than other 
energy sources. Clinton J. Andrews, Does the Fukushima Accident Significantly Increase the 
Nuclear Footprint?, ELECTRICITY J., July 2011, at 36, 39 (“[A]lthough nuclear is still ahead in 
the land-intensiveness game, its lead may not last. One more major accident in the next 20 
years is all it will take to make nuclear as land-intensive as solar . . . .”). It likewise has earned 
the moniker of a “clean” energy source, at least in many camps, because of its meager climate 
change impacts. See generally, e.g., Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear 
Power, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007); Bentley Mitchell, Note, Diffusing the Problem: How 
Adopting a Policy to Safely Store America’s Nuclear Waste May Help Combat Climate Change, 
28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 375 (2008).  
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capacity goes up in smoke, supply’s dominance in energy policy 
shines through. 
To understand how controlling this policy goal can be, deeper 
examination of the idea of supply in energy law is necessary. To 
embark on this exploration, a metaphor, and two ensuing 
conceptions of U.S. energy law, prove useful. 
A. A Metaphor 
The very idea of nuclear energy provides a helpful metaphor for 
considering energy law and its conventions. Although, as with any 
metaphor, the equation of nuclear power with energy law is not a 
perfect one, this metaphor does offer an effective way of simplifying, 
and thus thinking about, both how energy law operates and what 
critiques are lodged against it. 
 In severely oversimplified terms, nuclear energy works this way: 
Enriched uranium pellets are loaded into thin metal rods. Those rods 
are then organized into a reactor core, typically hexagonal or 
rectangular in shape. Inside the reactor core, neutrons strike 
uranium-235 atoms, which then split the atoms into lighter elements 
and more neutrons. The released neutrons then strike other atoms, 
perpetuating the cycle: a chain reaction.170 Importantly, this reaction 
also releases energy in the form of heat, which is used to warm water 
that, in turn, spins a turbine to create electricity.171 Control rods 
made of boron, cadmium, and other materials that absorb neutrons 
are lowered and raised in and out of the core to control the speed of 
the chain reaction.172  
Energy law itself might be thought of in terms of a nuclear 
reactor’s function. In this metaphor, the reactor’s fuel is energy law’s 
driving force: the field’s normative goals and policy objectives. The 
electricity produced by the reactor is the effect of how energy law is 
carried out: the field’s impact on society. And the control rods, 
which limit how quickly the reactor’s chain reaction occurs, are the 
constraints that energy law faces: the limits placed on the field’s goals 
by other legal disciplines and political influence. 
 
 170. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Nuclear Explained, EIA.GOV (June 6, 
2011), http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_home. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. For a pictorial representation of the process, see Energy Info. Admin., U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, Nonrenewable: Uranium (nuclear), EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/kids/ 
energy.cfm?page=nuclear_home-basics (last visited Dec. 1, 2011). 
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This representation of how energy law works, metaphorical as it 
is, proves useful because it offers a way of considering the role that 
disasters play in shaping our energy choices. Policy proposals, 
including those inspired by disasters, may ultimately change the kind 
of reaction that is happening in the power plant’s reactor core. But 
in doing so, the proposal inevitably will be shaped by the fuel firing 
that core. Unless the proposal changes the fuel itself, the power plant 
continues to produce electricity in the same manner it always has, 
through a radioactive chain reaction. 
Different nuclear power plants use different mechanisms for 
producing electricity, of course. The two dominant methods 
employed in the United States are boiling water reactors and 
pressurized water reactors.173 Challenges to the prevailing model of 
energy law thus might also suggest not simply a change in fuel type 
but also in reactor methodology—not only in substance but in 
process too. 
Part V takes up both types of critiques lodged against energy law 
today—substantive and procedural. First, however, it is important to 
understand how energy law functions. 
B. Energy Law: A Simplified Conception 
One, perhaps simplified, conception of how U.S. energy law 
works is that its metaphorical reactor core is filled with three fuel 
types: a trilogy of energy aims. They are for our energy policy to 
achieve an (1) abundant, (2) secure, and (3) inexpensive supply of 
energy. American energy policy often is expressed this way. “A 
fundamental objective of U.S. energy policy,” Allan Wendt told 
Congress twenty-five years ago, “is to assure an adequate supply of 
energy at reasonable cost while avoiding undue dependence on any  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 173. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, REACTOR CONCEPTS MANUAL 1–10, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/01.pdf. 
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single fuel or supplier.”174 In the quarter century since, little has 
changed. 
In this conception of energy law, the field’s three aims operate to 
produce a mutually optimal result. That is, the reactor seeks to 
maximize each of the goals simultaneously. If it cannot, then an 
abundance of a supply tends to dominate, with price being 
maximized secondarily and security third. Such an ordering might 
occur where the three objectives of energy law compete—where, for 
instance, one choice might yield a supply that is more abundant or 
secure than another but that is also more expensive. Thus, policy 
proposals in the field of energy law generally seek to maximize these 
aims.175 
Fukushima illustrates this. If the disaster at Fukushima is 
considered (again, in oversimplified terms) to be the neutron that 
starts the reactor’s chain reaction—in other words, a policy proposal 
seeking to change energy law’s results—the effect it produces must 
bear the marks of the reactor’s fuel. It will come forth only after 
passing through the core’s controlling normative objectives. 
Consequently, U.S. energy law’s incremental response to the disaster 
is wholly unsurprising.176 For a U.S. system focused so heavily on 
energy availability, proposals like Germany’s to eliminate nuclear 
power would affect supply abundance too dramatically to have any 
 
 174. E. Allan Wendt, The Oil Market and U.S. Energy Security, 86 DEP’T ST. BULL 51, 
53 (statement made before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Mar. 25, 
1986); see also National Energy Strategy: A New Start: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy 
and Power of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 10 (1991) (statement of 
Daniel Yergin noting national energy policy objectives of “cheap energy, secure energy, and 
clean energy”); PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INNOVATIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS 
TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 9, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ 
energy_policy_brief.pdf (“While U.S. energy policy has many sources, forms, and influences, it 
is nevertheless possible to identify four traditional objectives on which U.S. energy policy has 
focused: (1) a secure, plentiful, and diverse primary energy supply; (2) a robust, reliable 
infrastructure for energy conversion and delivery; (3) affordable and stable energy prices; and 
(4) environmentally sustainable energy production and use.”); Michael W. Grainey, Recent 
Federal Energy Legislation: Toward a National Energy Policy at Last?, 12 ENVTL. L. 29, 34 
(1981) (“Among the Department of Energy’s responsibilities . . . [is] the assurance of an 
adequate and reliable supply of energy at the lowest reasonable cost.”). 
 175. Cf. Chandler L. Van Orman, The National Energy Strategy—An Illusive Quest for 
Energy Security, 13 ENERGY L.J. 251, 254 (1992) (“While energy security, which by definition 
includes reasonable price maintenance, historically tops every administration’s list of national 
objectives, the methods of achieving this nirvana have constantly shifted.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 
65, 65–66 (1976) (noting U.S. energy policy’s reliance on “incremental past practices” rather 
than “long-term goals”). 
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salience domestically. Instead, the kind of suggestions that tend to 
prevail in the United States are those that do not harm supply at all, 
and that foster greater security while raising price only marginally, if 
at all.177 That, of course, is exactly what U.S. regulators have 
suggested in Fukushima’s wake: make U.S. nuclear plants safer, so 
they keep supplying electricity just as much as they do today.178 
Manifestations of this simplified model can be seen at multiple 
turns in American energy law. Utilities’ duty to serve is a foremost 
example. Historically, the pact that utilities have made in exchange 
for an exclusive service territory is to provide energy to any and all 
customers in that area. The assumption is that the level of energy 
demand in the territory is irrelevant because the supply the utility 
provides will be abundant and secure. The law compels utilities to 
abide by energy policy’s overarching objectives—including to assure 
abundant power supplies. As courts have repeatedly held, “[T]he 
term ‘public utility’ implies a public use, carrying with it the duty to 
serve the public and treat all persons alike, without discrimination, 
and it precludes the idea of service which is private in its nature, 
whether for the benefit and advantage of a few or of many . . . .”179 
Another manifestation of the model is unitization. Although the 
law today leaves petroleum markets largely to their own devices, 
 
 177. See, e.g., Thomas C. Jepperson & Michael B. McGinley, The “Marketable Location” 
Rule and Energy Policy Considerations, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 323, 326 (2004) 
(“During the 1970s, chronic natural gas shortages led to an overhaul of federal energy policy 
with the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) and the creation of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). One of FERC’s primary objectives was to 
foster a competitive gas supply system . . . . Underlying this objective was the belief that if price 
signals could be clearly and timely transmitted between buyers and sellers, market economics 
would assure an adequate supply of natural gas to meet market demand.”); Joseph T. Kelliher 
& Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 
622 (2009) (“Energy policy seeks to assure that the United States has an adequate electricity 
supply to meet the needs of consumers and a growing economy and that the price of that 
electricity is just and reasonable. Energy policy may also encourage fuel diversity in our 
electricity supply mix.”); Scott H. Segal, Fuel for Thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents, 
51 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 76 (2001) (“[F]ederal antitrust policy also underscores the objective of 
protecting consumer welfare through maintaining adequate energy supply and reasonable 
prices.”); David M. Smolin, The Paradox of the Future in Contemporary Energy Policy: A 
Human Rights Analysis, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 135, 172 (2009) (“Conventional energy policy 
seeks to facilitate an adequate supply of energy at a low price in order to facilitate economic 
activity and growth.”). 
 178. See supra Part III.B. 
 179. Devon-Aire Villas Homeowners Ass’n, No. 4 v. Americable Assocs., Ltd., 490 So. 
2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Higgs v. City of Fort Pierce, 118 So. 2d 582, 
585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)). 
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where it does interfere, it generally does so to amplify supplies. This 
is the case with oil and gas unitization. Through unitization, 
disparate ownership tracts overlying a common pool resource such as 
oil or gas are treated as a single unit, with the royalties from 
extraction divided proportionally. The idea is that managing the pool 
as one will be more effective at extracting the resource than allowing 
multiple entities to withdraw individually, which might reduce 
overall field pressure and thus decrease the total amount of resource 
ultimately removed.180 The idea, in other words, is to maximize 
supply by avoiding waste. The Kansas Supreme Court has explained: 
It is now common knowledge that this tired old world of ours, and 
our country in particular, is faced with the frightening and 
progressive energy crisis due principally to a shortage of petroleum 
reserves. . . . Under these severe conditions we feel that it is 
incumbent on all persons . . . to assist in the preservation and 
conservation of our natural petroleum resources including 
production methods which will minimize waste. 
 Pooling and unitization are basically conservation measures 
adopted either by forced regulation in some states or by voluntary 
agreement. . . . The primary purpose of unitized operations is to 
permit proper and maximum development of the unit lands 
without reference to ownership boundaries and with a minimum of 
waste.181 
A third example comes from a more recent change in energy law. 
In the summer of 2003, approximately fifty million people in New 
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Ontario lost power as a 
result of cascading transmission and generation failures: an 
unprecedented blackout.182 Partially in response to this event, the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) gave the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) authority to oversee the 
reliability of the United States’ bulk transmission system.183 Notably, 
 
 180. E.g., Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004 
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 277, 280–83 (2004). 
 181. Classen v. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 617 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Kan. 1980). 
 182. See generally U.S.-CANADA POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 
ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (April 2004), https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf. 
 183. FERC regulates hydropower under Part I of the FPA and electricity rates under 
Sections 205 and 206 of Part II. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–824w (2006). 
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this bestowal of authority did not take place until eighty-five years 
after Congress created FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power 
Commission. That is, for nearly a century, federal electricity law 
focused on other areas, including supply through hydropower 
regulation and price through FERC’s control of just and reasonable 
wholesale electricity prices.184 Only after a crisis forced transmission 
reliability to the forefront did federal law take up the question of 
transmission security. And then the response to the disaster of the 
2003 blackouts was very much like that to Fukushima. Rather than 
asking broader questions about the state of the nation’s transmission 
system—including whether massive new capacity was needed or how 
to solve the problem of siting lines in a NIMBY world185—the 
authority granted by EPAct 2005 hewed closely to the proximate 
cause of the disaster. It gave FERC power to certify an “electric 
reliability organization” that would enforce operating standards, not 
the authority to reassess the structure of the transmission system 
altogether.186 Incrementalism prevailed. 
 
 184. See id. § 824p. 
 185. See generally, e.g., Steven Ferrey, JAMES A. HOLTKAMP & MARK A. DAVIDSON, 
TRANSMISSION SITING IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES (2009), http://tinyurl.com/ 
743pmjx; Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate New Renewable 
Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977 (2009); Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why 
Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. 
Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327 (2007); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of 
Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009). “NIMBY” 
refers to the “not in my backyard” phenomenon—that although everyone benefits from 
facilities such as electrical transmission lines, no community prefers to have them sited locally. 
Some critics of NIMBYism suggest that it is one factor causing the overburdening of minority 
and lower income communities with environmental harms. See generally, e.g., Michael B. 
Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).  
 186. The authority granted to FERC in the 2005 Act, however, is rather circumscribed. 
One commentator has summarized: 
To be sure, the law did not grant FERC plenary power to site transmission facilities 
with no state involvement. The agency can only issue a siting permit in areas 
designated as “National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors” by the 
Department of Energy (based on transmission congestion) and then only if a state 
where the transmission facilities are to be located either does not have authority to 
approve their siting (or to consider the interstate benefits of the project), has such 
authority but has withheld approval for more than one year, or approved the project 
with unreasonable conditions. 
Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and Regulation: A Look Back, 25 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33 (2010); see also Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 
304 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, U.S. No. 09–343 (Jan. 19, 2010). This limited authority has 
been cited as one impediment to clean energy development in the United States. In addition, a 
recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 
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In these examples and others, energy law’s priority on supply 
shines through. This simple conception of energy law thus appears to 
answer the question of why disasters only nudge the law rather than 
transform it. It also demonstrates how a focus on disasters as a 
catalyst for legal change perpetuates that incrementalism: even 
tragedies as striking as Fukushima can be “solved” by adding new 
legal safeguards that address the specific issue that led to the disaster, 
without ever weighing the root causes and systemic conditions that 
made the disaster possible in the first instance. 
What this model of energy policy does not answer, however, is 
why the law does not focus on more abundant resources than those 
that presently dominate our energy consumption. Renewable 
resources such as the sun, wind, and waves are far more abundant 
than any nonrenewable resource we use today. If supply is king, why 
does the law not push society harder to harness these resources, 
which offer both a more abundant and a more secure energy supply 
than oil, gas, coal, and nuclear combined? To answer that question, a 
slightly more complex conception of energy law is required. 
C. Energy Law: A Fuller Conception 
Two decades ago, Professor Joseph Tomain delineated this 
competing, fuller conception of energy law.187 In his view, energy 
law’s reactor core does not contain three fuel types but six. Tomain 
posited that this “dominant paradigm” of energy policy does not 
seek simply to maximize supply, price, and security in that order, but 
rather, aims to maximize supply and price simultaneously—and that 
it does so in a very specific way.188 As Tomain noted, energy policy in 
the United States emphasizes established, archetype fuels and firms 
as a way to ensure supply, abundance, and security. It then relies 
primarily on markets to guarantee efficiencies in cost: 
Domestic energy policy from the late nineteenth century to the 
present is based on the fundamental assumption that a link exists 
between the level of energy production and the gross national 
product. . . . As a consequence, domestic energy policy favors 
 
476 (7th Cir. 2009), has been singled out as an impediment to getting renewables onto the 
grid. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman et al., supra note 12, at 859. 
 187. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 355, 374 (1990). 
 188. Id. 
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large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive, integrated, and 
centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels. These archetype 
energy firms are favored over alternatives such as small solar or 
wind firms because energy policymakers believe that the larger 
firms can continue to realize economies of scale. . . . This belief 
may or may not be true. Nevertheless, it persists . . . . Thus, the 
dominant energy policy has the following general goals: 
(1)  to assure abundant supplies; 
(2)  to maintain reasonable prices; 
(3)  to limit the market power of archetype firms; 
(4)  to promote inter- and intrafuel competition; 
(5) to support a limited number of conventional fuels (oil,  
 natural gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power); and, 
(6) to allow energy decisionmaking and policymaking to  
 develop within an active federal-state regulatory  
 system.189 
Plainly, Professor Tomain was describing how energy policy 
actually functions, not what he would like it to become.190 
Nevertheless, his conception of energy policy is important because it 
explains the field’s lack of emphasis on renewables. Many of the 
technologies that use those resources are not as well established as 
fossil fuel technologies—they are not conventional fuels—and they 
generally have higher marginal costs than incumbent facilities—so 
they lose out to other options in the marketplace on which the 
dominant paradigm traditionally has relied. 
Tomain’s conception of energy law also is consistent with our 
understanding of why disasters like Fukushima do not move the law 
very far. In fact, his conception may offer an even better explanation 
of this phenomenon than the more simplified version. As with the 
simpler conception, the meltdown at Fukushima should not 
fundamentally change energy law under Professor Tomain’s model, 
because doing so would be inconsistent with the objective of 
assuring a secure (here, already existing in the nuclear fleet) and 
abundant (again, already existing in the provision of twenty percent 
 
 189. Id. at 374–76. 
 190. Cf. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 243 (2011) (“Our energy future no long resides in fossil fuels; it resides in a 
substantial ramping up of energy efficiency and renewable resources.”). 
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of American electricity) supply of power. Unlike the simpler model, 
however, the model laid bare by Professor Tomain also helps explain 
why, in the wake of Fukushima, Germany abandoned nuclear power 
entirely and Japan at least weighed the option, but the United States 
did not even put the option on the table. Ditching nuclear to go 
heavily renewable as Germany did violates multiple additional pillars 
of Tomain’s framework, including the tendency to rely on a few 
conventional fuels and archetype firms. The simpler model lacks 
these pillars. Culture, moreover, matters in shaping those pillars. The 
energy culture of the United States is different than Germany’s; we 
emphasize archetype fuels while they increasingly favor renewables.191 
In Tomain’s fuller conception of American energy policy, in other 
words, the German option is a chain reaction the U.S. energy policy 
reactor cannot produce. 
Still, the model described by Tomain does not account for a 
growing area of energy law that, facially, appears to undermine this 
six-pronged concept. In 1978, Congress adopted the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”),192 which affirmatively sought to 
counteract the dominance of large, vertically integrated, incumbent 
electricity suppliers and their reliance on traditional fuels. PURPA 
required utilities to purchase power from smaller—and renewable—
generators at premium prices, referred to in the statute as “avoided 
cost” rates.193 Likewise, since the 1990s, there has been an explosion 
of state laws promoting renewable generation.194 These laws, 
generically referred to as renewable portfolio standards, or “RPSs,” 
compel electric utilities to provide a given percentage of  
 
 
 191. Germany has used an aggressive “feed-in” tariff to promote renewable energy for 
years now. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. By contrast, the United States has 
proposed a national renewable portfolio standard literally dozens of times—and never 
succeeded in passing it. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National 
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1365 (2010); Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s 
No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 n.11 (2006). 
 192. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of titles 7, 15, 16, and 30 U.S.C.). 
 193. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17), 824a-3(a). 
 194. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Is There a “Race,” and Is It “To the Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO 
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. (forthcoming 2011) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); 
BARRY G. RABE, PEW CTR. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE TOP: THE EXPANDING 
ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf. 
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their sales from renewable-based generators.195 Nearly three quarters 
of states now have these laws on the books.196 
PURPA and RPSs both seem like ill fits with Tomain’s 
conception of U.S. energy policy. Both force adoption of more 
expensive technologies. Both promote nontraditional fuels, often 
from non-archetype firms. And both meddle in markets by changing 
the decisions that utilities would make but for the laws. Do these 
counterparts disprove his model? 
One answer is that the model described by Tomain is too rigid 
and that the simpler, three-part conception more accurately 
encompasses the whole of energy law and the flexibility that such a 
broad scope implies. Tomain’s model, in other words, might 
accurately describe U.S. energy policy in some but not in all 
instances. Given the intransigence of archetype fuels and energy firms 
over the last 100 years, however, this explanation seems unlikely. 
Despite laws like PURPA and RPSs, our nation continues to rely 
heavily on fossil and other nonrenewable fuels.197 In that light, laws 
like PURPA and RPSs come across more as anomaly than as 
customary. 
Returning, however, to the reactor core metaphor may offer an 
alternate view that allows for Tomain’s conception to coexist with 
renewables-promotion and other such energy laws that do not fit 
perfectly within its six-pronged framework. Seeing the question this 
way, laws like PURPA and RPSs are not traditional energy laws as 
such. Rather, they represent a gradual evolution in modern energy 
policy in which historical energy law aims have begun to meld with 
environmental objectives.198 That is, these laws do not just try to 
assure abundant, cheap, and secure supplies of archetype fuels but 
demand also that environmental impacts be simultaneously 
 
 195. See, e.g., Cal. S.B.X1-2 (2001), amending CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 
399.15(b)(2)(B); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 7-703(b)(17) (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
62–133.8(b) (2011). 
 196. See RPS Policies, DSIRE (Feb. 2011), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/ 
summarymaps/RPS_map.pptx. 
 197. Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29 
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 75 (2009). 
 198. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 191, at 1390–96; Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National 
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (2010). See generally Lincoln L. 
Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 
(2010) [hereinafter Davies, Alternative Energy]; Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a 
Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010). 
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mitigated. As Professor Jim Rossi has noted, the merger of “the 
goals and regulatory tools [of] environmental and energy law . . . has 
been occurring over the past thirty years.”199 Laws like PURPA and 
RPSs are one reflection of this. 
In this view, then, the fuller model still prevails. The reactor fuel, 
so to speak, remains dictated by Tomain’s six-sided frame. It is only 
that laws like PURPA and RPSs constitute some of the control rods 
that are lowered into the core chamber to moderate the reaction. 
They infuse additional policy goals that constrain, but are not part 
and parcel of, the reactor fuel itself. 
V. ENERGY FUTURES, NUCLEAR FUTURES:  
CRITIQUES AND REFORMATIONS 
Thinking of energy law in terms of a nuclear reaction that 
produces an important social good—electricity—but that also risks 
devastating consequences—meltdowns—offers another benefit. It 
provides a platform for understanding the typology of both (1) the 
critiques that have been lodged against U.S. energy policy and 
(2) how the field might be reformed in light of those critiques. This 
Part summarizes those critiques and suggestions for reform. It 
concludes by returning to the example of Fukushima, assessing its 
likely impact on nuclear energy in general and on energy law in the 
United States specifically. 
A. Critiques 
The most prevalent critique of American energy law today is that 
it is unsustainable. By focusing on primarily short-term economic 
effects, the argument goes, energy law risks undermining the land, 
resources, and social, natural, and economic systems on which we 
rely. The critique is thus that energy law is short-sighted: that it 
overemphasizes the here and now at the cost of our future. This 
sustainability tack is the primary substantive critique on energy law. 
In addition, there are procedural criticisms as well. 
1. Substance 
Putting it in terms of our running metaphor, the unsustainability 
critique of energy law is that the reactor core is loaded with the 
 
 199. Rossi, supra note 198, at 1447. 
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wrong kind of fuel. The solution is to swap out the existing fuel, 
comprised of the six-pronged dominant paradigm exposed by 
Professor Tomain, with a new power source that emphasizes not 
only immediate economic returns but also long-lasting human, 
economic, and ecological health. Professor Gary Bryner cast the 
choice this way: 
If one begins with the assumption that economic growth is the 
primary imperative in American politics . . . then one must simply 
learn to live with and adapt to whatever ecological consequences 
occur. However, if one begins with the view that ecological 
sustainability is the primary political goal and a prerequisite for 
every other activity, then energy policy must be shaped in ways that 
are consistent with that overriding imperative.200 
This unsustainability critique comes in two primary versions, one 
environmental and one economic. At its broadest, the environmental 
critique echoes the choice highlighted by Professor Bryner. It is that 
our unquenchable energy appetite threatens the natural systems on 
which we rely, yet energy law does little to reign in that appetite 
while simultaneously failing to account fully for the costs the appetite 
imposes on society. 
This version of the critique is ubiquitous in the modern literature 
and current political debates,201 most prominently in the form of calls 
for climate change regulation.202 The critique, however, runs more 
broadly than climate change alone, for as much as some might want 
to make energy policy become climate policy, it is not. Energy 
policy, whether “clean” or not, by necessity must remain much 
broader than the single question of climate. As Professor Amy 
Wildermuth recently observed, 
The question [is] how we can craft an energy strategy that takes 
into account both our energy needs and the environmental 
 
 200. Bryner, supra note 9, at 342. 
 201. See generally, e.g., TOMAIN, supra note 190; John C. Dernbach et al., Progress 
Toward Sustainability: A Report Card and a Recommended Agenda, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS 
& ANALYSIS 10,275, 10,278 (2009); Irma S. Russell, The Sustainability Principle in 
Sustainable Energy, 44 TULSA L. REV. 121 (2008). 
 202. See generally, e.g., Ned Farquhar, Energy, Security, Climate: Converging Solutions, 29 
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (2009); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Energy and 
Environmental Policy for Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 655 (2010); Mark E. Rosen, 
Energy Independence and Climate Change: The Economic and National Security Consequences of 
Failing to Act, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 977 (2010). 
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consequences of each energy source. Given that all energy begins as 
a natural resource of some kind . . . it would make sense to attempt 
to balance energy production’s environmental impacts with 
questions of the energy’s cost and availability.203 
The economic version of the unsustainability critique is that 
energy law is inefficient. One way energy law might be inefficient is 
by ignoring the long-term depletion of resources, and thus, not 
preparing society for what is sure to be a very bumpy transition to 
new fuels.204 The retort, of course, is that the market will correct 
itself—that once fuels become sufficiently scarce, their price will 
increase and the incentive to switch to (and to innovate) new 
technologies that can counteract the trend will rapidly occur. 
Nevertheless, advocates, for instance, of addressing peak oil205 insist 
that the current system allows the intransigence of archetype fuels 
too long, and that it extends their natural life through subsidies, 
favoritism, and other mechanisms.206 
Alternatively, the economic critique of energy law suggests that 
the system is inefficient because it is too “large.” These arguments, 
made famous by Amory Lovins, contend that our very energy 
infrastructure should be reshaped to allow for smaller, more 
 
 203. Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and 
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 379 (2011). 
 204. See, e.g., Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?): Developing the 
Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 
88 OR. L. REV. 405, 431–33 (2009); Evan N. Turgeon, Triple-Dividends: Toward Pigovoian 
Gasoline Taxation, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 145, 150–55 (2010). 
 205. Peak oil can be defined as the point when “worldwide, long-term oil production will 
follow the famous ‘Hubbert curve’ and thereafter inevitably decline.” Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 
The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy: An “Eventual” Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 508 
(2006). The debate over when peak oil will occur (or whether it already has) can be fierce, but 
there is an emerging consensus that it is a problem that should be addressed. Cf., e.g., Joshua 
P. Fershee, Struggling Past Oil: The Infrastructure Impediments to Adopting Next-Generation 
Transportatoin Fuel Sources, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 87, 88 n.9 (2010) (“Although the concept of 
Peak Oil is not universally accepted, ‘one must accept Peak Oil as a working hypothesis while 
respecting the competing analyses that have been espoused by others.’” (quoting Richard D. 
Cudahy, The Bell Tolls for Hydrocarbons: What’s Next?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 381, 387 (2008)); 
Diana M. Liebmann, Recent Developments in Texas and United States Energy Law, 4 TEX. J. 
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 363, 436 (2009) (“Peak oil is a hotly debated topic, but no matter 
where one stands on this issue, there are reasons to expect that the supply in the U.S. will not 
meet the growing pace of demand.”). 
 206. See generally, e.g., KENNETH S. DEFFEYES, BEYOND OIL: THE VIEW FROM 
HUBBERT’S PEAK (2005); PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF OIL: ON THE EDGE OF A PERILOUS 
NEW WORLD (2005). 
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distributed, “softer” energy paths.207 They suggest, among other 
things, that we waste huge amounts of energy by moving it long 
distances from central power stations to load centers, and that by 
moving generation closer to home, the delivery of electricity would 
be both less costly and more environmentally sensible.208 In any case, 
they acknowledge that to pursue this kind of more efficient energy 
system, we also need a different energy law—a new kind of reactor 
fuel. 
2. Procedure 
Finally, some commentators have critiqued not only energy law’s 
goals but also its process—not just of the reactor fuel itself but also 
of the way the reactor produces electricity. 
One emerging critique on this front is that energy law fails to 
coordinate with environmental law as well as it should.209 In the 
alternative energy context, for instance, energy law and 
environmental law often work at cross-purposes.210 Advancing 
renewable energy technologies simultaneously reduces pollution and 
enhances energy security; if pursued more vigorously, it would 
advance the objectives of both fields. Yet to a large degree, energy 
law has failed to effect any real change on this front, the multiple 
state efforts at promoting renewables through RPSs and other 
measures notwithstanding. “[T]he fact that energy law and 
environmental law promote different goals clearly has restrained the 
adoption of more renewables. Both energy law’s focus on reliability 
and its emphasis on cost temper any incentive that environmental law 
might create for alternative energy production.”211 
An undue emphasis on crises, or disasters, is itself another form 
of the process-based critique of energy law.212 Energy law, like 
environmental law, tends to be “reactive in [its] approach. 
 
 207. See generally AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 
(1977). 
 208. See, e.g., Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta 
of Energy Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower Ratepayers, 22 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011). 
 209. See generally, e.g., Davies, Alternative Energy, supra note 198; Wildermuth, supra 
note 198. 
 210. Davies, Alternative Energy, supra note 198; Wildermuth, supra note 198. 
 211. See Davies, Alternative Energy, supra note 198, at 502 (footnote omitted). 
 212. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 157, at 239. 
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Environmental laws often ‘appear to be performing triage; they are 
the equivalent of an emergency response to environmental problems, 
an ER or Urgent Care.’ Likewise, energy law is often playing catch-
up with the latest crisis be it Enron or climate change.”213 By 
focusing on crises and disasters, two deleterious effects may result for 
energy law. First, the process employed can be too hurried, 
potentially making the outcome achieved suboptimal. Second, 
honing in on emergencies can skew the law’s vision, so that pressing 
problems receive an inordinate amount of attention and those that 
are in fact more critical—but slower-burning—are pushed to the 
side. Certainly, the latter could be used to characterize Fukushima’s 
impact on nuclear policy in the United States. It is likely that some 
rules for reactor licensing and operation will change. That in itself is 
not untoward; likely, quite the contrary. Despite these efforts, 
however, more difficult problems remain—including forging a 
solution for long-term nuclear waste disposal.214 
B. Reformations 
Addressing the critiques of energy law requires matching 
solutions to infirmities. This applies to both substance and process: 
the reformation demanded by the charge that energy law is 
unsustainable is to make it more sustainable—to switch one fuel for 
another. The change demanded by the critiques of energy law’s 
process is to create a new process—not to swap out the reactor fuel, 
but to alter the way the reactor makes electricity. 
 
 213. Wildermuth, supra note 203, at 381 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wildermuth, 
supra note 13, at 149). 
 214. See, e.g., Hannah Northey, Court Reveals Timeline for Case That Could Affect Fate of 
Repository, GREENWIRE (Nov. 7, 2011) (discussing status of litigation over the Obama 
administration’s attempted withdrawal of the permit application for the proposed Yucca 
Mountain high-level nuclear waste depository). See generally Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley 
Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 331–32 
(2009) (summarizing the dilemma of nuclear waste disposal and Congress’s reaction thereto 
with passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law 
and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783, 804–09 (2008) (discussing 
nuclear waste disposal challenges at Yucca Mountain); Cinnamon Gilbreath, Note, Federalism 
in the Context of Yucca Mountain: Nevada v. Department of Energy, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577 
(2000). 
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1. Sustainability 
One obvious way to make energy law focus more on 
sustainability is to replace its current short-term, economically-
focused objectives with broader, longer-view aims. There are 
multiple possible iterations of this option.  
A “deep,” or bedrock-level, change designed to make energy law 
more sustainable would be to elevate ecological sustainability and 
make all other objectives subordinate to it. This is the version of 
sustainability that Professor Bryner referred to when he argued for 
making energy “decisions . . . driven by ecological preservation” and 
then to “live with and adapt to whatever energy supplies and prices 
result from those decisions.”215  
At the other end of the spectrum is a weaker form of 
sustainability, a kind of “sustainability lite.” Arguably, this is what 
the “control rods” of environmental regulation already impose on 
energy law, at least to the degree they actually capture the 
externalities of energy production and consumption.216 
Finally, in between these two poles is a middle ground—what 
might be referred to as “mainstream” sustainability. Mainstream 
sustainability, or “sustainable development” as it often is called, seeks 
to maximize a “triple bottom line.”217 In environmental circles, this 
typically is referred to as the “three Es”: environment, economy, 
equity.218 In corporate realms, it is the “three Ps”: profit, people, 
 
 215. Bryner, supra note 9, at 342. 
 216. Cf., e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: 
Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 874 (2011) 
(noting that “[m]any of the [modern] developments towards integrationist multimodality in 
U.S. environmental law are at the edges of environmental law, where environmental law 
interacts or engages with other fields of law, policy, and collective action,” including energy 
law). 
 217. See generally Ben Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The 
Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into Action, 31 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307, 317–19 (1995) (interpreting sustainable development); John C. 
Dernbach, Sustainable Development: Now More Than Ever, in STUMBLING TOWARD 
SUSTAINABILITY 45, 45 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (defining sustainability). 
 218. See J. William Futrell, Defining Sustainable Development Law, 19 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 9, 9 (2004) (“For more than a decade the term ‘sustainable development’ has 
denoted an effort to meld concerns for environmental protection, economic well-being, and 
social justice.”); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3–14, 1992, Promoting Sustainable Human Settlement Development, ¶¶ 7.1–.4, U.N. 
Doc. A/ CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex II (1993) (identifying considerations in the 
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planet.219 In either case, the core idea of sustainability is to advance 
all three of the objectives over a long timeframe, creating prosperity 
both now and in the future.  
The objective of sustainable development . . . is to achieve a social 
framework in which economy, environment, and equity all are 
sustainable in perpetuity over all geographic scales. . . . It is not 
sufficient merely to strike a balance between economy, 
environment, and equity that brings the three into harmony for the 
moment; rather, we must [do so] over time . . . .220 
The advantage of substituting sustainability for energy law’s 
current objectives is that it could lead to what energy law so far has 
failed to obtain: true energy independence. For instance, a 
sustainability-based energy law might push harder and faster toward 
renewables. To the extent it did, both energy law’s current aims of 
supply abundance and security, and the environmental goals of 
better ecological protection, could be achieved. This, of course, 
would require a major reorienting of energy policy. Rather than the 
current prevailing paradigm, a new one would need to emerge. This 
paradigm, which we might call an “alternative energy paradigm,”221 
would borrow some pillars from the extant model but infuse ideas of 
sustainability of its own. It might look like this: 
 
1) Assure sustainable supplies of energy; 
2) Maintain reasonable prices, based on real and 
internalized costs; 
3) Harness the power of archetype firms to overhaul our 
energy structure and begin cultural change; 
4) Promote a deliberate move to renewable energy sources, 
based on hard science, not politics; and 
5) Support competition among fuels.222 
 
Indeed, a sustainability-based energy law would not measure 
economic success on mere profits, but also on whether the energy 
 
context of sustainable human settlement development). 
 219. E.g., PETER FISK, PEOPLE, PLANET, PROFIT: HOW TO EMBRACE SUSTAINABILITY 
FOR INNOVATION AND BUSINESS GROWTH (2010). 
 220. J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for 
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 39, 43 (1999). 
 221. Davies, supra note 197, at 74. 
 222. Id. at 83. 
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supplies and technologies it was delivering would last for the long 
run. In this way, a sustainable form of energy law would also tend to 
further the merger of energy law and environmental law, and thus, 
potentially solve some of the process concerns raised about energy 
law today. If the objectives of both fields were married into a unified 
framework, they would no longer undermine each other.223 
One problem, however, with injecting sustainability into energy 
law is that it might make the decisionmaking calculus more complex. 
Today, energy outcomes, or their general direction at least, are fairly 
certain. If they do not comport with the dominant paradigm, they 
are less likely to occur. Make sustainability the new model and the 
results become more indeterminate. Just as there is an ordering 
problem in the simpler, three-part conception of energy law—where, 
for instance, supply abundance and price efficiency potentially stand 
at odds—the same dilemma exists if sustainability’s triple bottom line 
becomes the controlling paradigm. Indeed, disentangling all the 
things that national energy policy is supposed to achieve, and 
balance, is no easy task. As the Carter administration noted, energy 
problems are “a complex tangle of sometimes competing national 
goals—market efficiency and greater production, equity among 
income classes and regions, environmental protection, national 
security, economic growth, and inflationary restraint. It [is] difficult, 
and sometimes impossible, to reconcile all these goals.”224 
Should renewables be promoted because they provide a more 
abundant long-term supply of energy, or should coal be utilized 
more heavily because it has a higher energy value, is less expensive, 
and thus frees resources that could be used on further research and 
development for other technologies? Should tar sands and oil shale 
be tapped because they are available domestically and are located far 
from population centers, or are their environmental consequences 
too great? Should more bulk-scale transmission be built, or should 
we focus on transforming our energy infrastructure by promoting 
smaller scale distributed generation projects? There are no easy 
answers to these questions, whether framed in terms of sustainability  
 
 
 
 223. Davies, supra note 191, at 1390–96. 
 224. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-29, ENERGY POLICY: CHANGES 
NEEDED TO MAKE NATIONAL ENERGY PLANNING MORE USEFUL 29 (1993) (quoting the 
1979 national energy plan). 
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or otherwise. Better energy law processes may help, although alone 
they too may fall short of the task.225 
2. Planning 
Beyond moving energy law substantively toward sustainability, 
another option would be to change some of the processes the field 
now uses. Here, a key question is the role of planning. 
Presently, energy law leaves many choices to free market 
mechanisms. Even in the field of electricity, once heavily regulated 
and dominated by natural monopolies, this has become the case.226 
President Reagan finished off oil price controls,227 and the Clinton-
era FERC drove cost-of-service ratemaking to the periphery, for 
wholesale power sales at least.228 Perhaps this was inevitable. The 
dominant energy paradigm heavily favors markets after all. In any 
case, the shift from cost-based to market-based regulation in energy 
law is one that generally has been lauded for making the law more 
 
 225. Professor Robert Adler makes the parallel point in the water context. “A disaster 
prevention strategy designed to reduce vulnerability to drought may require changes to deep-
rooted economic policies in the agricultural and other sectors of the economy. At the most 
basic level, it will require us to rethink what conditions we consider a ‘disaster,’ as opposed to 
the normal range of variability in weather and other conditions within particular regions.” 
Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation: U.S. Water, Drought 
and Agricultural Law, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1809946. The same might be said about energy choices. Under the disaster lens, at 
what point does the risk of another Fukushima outweigh the cost of climate change? 
 226. For accounts of deregulation—or restructuring—in the electric industry, see, for 
example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 463–64 (2005); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The 
Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 781 n.70; Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study 
in Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 829–37 (1998). 
 227. See Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1981); Joseph P. Tomain, Toward a 
Sustainable Energy-Environmental Policy, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 6-1, 6-24 (2000) (noting that President Reagan’s action was “largely symbolic, 
however, because [the price controls] were scheduled to terminate on October 1st of that 
year”).  
 228. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999); Bernard S. Black & 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. 
Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1343–48 (1993); Joseph D. Kearney & 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1323, 1325 (1998); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767–69 (2008). On historic regulation of the electricity industry, see, 
for example, Suedeen G. Kelly, Electricity, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, supra note 227, at 12-10 to -11. 
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efficient, directionally at least if not in every execution of the general 
plan. Today there are not widespread calls for this revolution’s 
wholesale reversal.229 
One possible counterpart to free markets, nevertheless, is careful 
planning. Energy law already incorporates some planning. PURPA 
encourages states to engage in integrated resource planning with 
their utilities, so that truly least-cost options are chosen, demand-
side management is not ignored, and environmental concerns are not 
overlooked.230 At a much broader level, the Energy Reorganization 
Act requires a national energy plan to be prepared and submitted to 
Congress biennially—a process that helps set our national energy 
priorities, theoretically if not actually.231 
There are, however, two clear deficiencies in this national 
planning process. First, it has not been particularly effective. A 1993 
study showed that no national energy plan prepared as of that date 
had complied with the law’s requirement to set forth five-year and 
ten-year objectives for energy supply and demand.232 Moreover, the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 modified the law. Following these 
amendments, the plan cannot simply examine energy possibilities 
holistically but must tilt heavily toward cost; it is compelled to 
recommend the “least cost” resources for use.233 
Second, this planning process has limited impact. It is process 
and little more: it sets no binding mandates, it imposes no limits on 
environmental effects or costs, and it is subject to the whim of the 
prevailing political winds of the time. It also may be a rather hollow 
process. At least one analysis revealed that virtually every national 
energy plan has made similar recommendations, only ordered 
differently from year to year.234 It thus should not be surprising that 
 
 229. This of course does not mean that the shift to market-based regulation in energy has 
gone without criticism. Compare, e.g., Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From 
Insull to Enron: Corporate Re(regulation) After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 
ENERGY L.J. 35, 108 (2005) (calling electricity restructuring “on balance a success”), with 
Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1141, 1158 n.89 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005)) 
(deeming it a “fiasco”), and Robert Kuttner, Keynote Address, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 417, 421 (2008) (finding it a “palpable failure”). 
 230. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2602(19), 2621(d)(7) (2006). 
 231. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7321. 
 232. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 224, at 3. 
 233. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1602, 106 Stat. 2776, 2999–
3001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13382). 
 234. Van Orman, supra note 175, at 264. 
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some participants in the process have suggested that the steps of 
making the plan are more valuable than the plan itself.235 
This, however, could change. Energy law could mandate a high-
level, binding planning process that produces goals enforceable at 
multiple levels of government. A new law could, for instance, use 
nationally set and administered generation portfolio targets—much 
like state-level RPSs do for renewables but for all classes of 
generation fuels. This would make energy law’s objectives both 
clearer and more comprehensive.236 Because the goals would have 
actual effect, debate over what they should be and how they should 
be carried out should be more robust. The use of this kind of 
planning process would not dictate outcomes; the plan could 
embrace the objectives of the existing energy paradigm or a more 
sustainability-based one. It also could pursue efficiency, operating via 
markets for each resource, so that each utility could employ the 
generation mix most efficient and economically optimal for it. 
In this way, energy law could achieve its objectives in a more 
orderly, calculated, and measurable way. It would not by itself alter 
the underlying objectives of the field, but it might make the process 
of achieving those goals more efficient—and, because they are more 
measurable, more effective too.  
C. Fukushima’s Shadow: Nuclear Power and the Future of Energy Law 
Only months before the tsunami struck Fukushima, two 
observers of U.S. energy policy wrote this of nuclear energy’s future: 
A serious accident at an existing nuclear plant—anywhere in the 
world—would have a dampening effect on the public’s acceptance 
of nuclear power plants. The new plants have safety features and 
designs that greatly lessen or eliminate the chance of a catastrophic 
accident, however, convincing the pubic of that fact could be 
extremely difficult if there is another Three Mile Island or 
Chernobyl.237 
 
 
 235. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 224, at 33. 
 236. Of course, the difficulty in transforming our national energy landscape rests not just 
with changing technology but with combatting the “deceptively difficult” problem of 
infrastructure as well. Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 UTAH 
ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 339 (2011). 
 237. Nancy A. Wodka & Salo L. Zelermyer, Using the Nuclear Option to Find Middle 
Ground on Energy Policy, ELECTRICITY J., May 2010, at 19, 24. 
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Their assessment was not an isolated one. Before Fukushima, many 
concurred that the “nuclear renaissance” long anticipated in the 
United States was unlikely to arrive anytime soon.238 
After Fukushima, the future of nuclear energy is even more 
uncertain.239 Six years ago, Joseph Tomain charted three possible 
paths forward for the nuclear industry and, by extension, for energy 
law itself.240 One path, he wrote, was of a “Promotional Nuclear 
Policy”—a path in which the government affirmatively advocated for 
and supported “the use of nuclear power over coal to generate 
electricity.”241 The second path was one of a “Precautionary Nuclear 
Policy”—a path that “emphasizes coal over nuclear power” because 
it focuses so heavily on nuclear “safety including the disposal of 
radioactive wastes and the avoidance of the various nuclear 
catastrophes.”242 Finally, Professor Tomain argued for a “Smart 
Energy Policy”—an alternative path to either of the nuclear-
dependent options, a path that relies more on distributed generation, 
emphasizes renewables and efficiency, and excises nuclear power 
from the equation.243 
Tomain readily acknowledged that both of the nuclear-reliant 
futures he foresaw “accept the dominant model of energy policy with 
its reliance on large-scale, capital-intensive energy producers.”244 His 
suggestion was that the “Smart Energy Policy” leads toward a more 
prosperous future in part because it abandons this prevailing 
paradigm. 
 
 238. E.g., Is It Time to Abandon Talk of a Nuclear ‘Renaissance’?, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 
2010, at 1; Nuclear Costs: Clouded, but Rising, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2010, at 1; Steve 
Thomas, Competitive Energy Markets and Nuclear Power: Can We Have Both, Do We Want 
Either?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4903 (2010). 
 239. John Rowe, CEO of Exelon, the largest owner of nuclear facilities in the United 
States, recently put the odds of a domestic nuclear renaissance at fifty percent. Hannah 
Northey, Exelon CEO Says Renaissance Has ‘50-50’ Chance, GREENWIRE, Nov. 9, 2011 
(“‘Most of us have spent our lives believing there has to be a nuclear revolution, and I still 
think that’s a 50-50 possibility.’ . . . ‘Trouble is, it’s always 15 years away.’”); see also Keith 
Bradsher, China Marches on with Nuclear Energy, in Spite of Fukushima, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2011, http://tinyurl.com/cnfpyfl (assessing the chance of nuclear expansion in different 
regions); Stephanie Cooke, After Fukushima, Does Nuclear Power Have a Future?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/7taednw (same). 
 240. Tomain, supra note 2.  
 241. Id. at 237. In a later commentary, Professor Fred Bosselmann endorsed this path, 
largely on environmental grounds. See Bosselman, supra note 169. 
 242. Tomain, supra note 2, at 237. 
 243. Id. at 246–48. 
 244. Id. at 237. 
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While the question remains of what will become of the U.S. 
nuclear industry post-Fukushima,245 it seems unlikely that the 
accident will foment a sea change in energy policy overall. 
Fukushima instigated overhaul in Germany, but so far in Japan246—
and even more so here at home—the response has been much more 
measured. It would be alarming if NRC regulation of existing and 
new nuclear facilities is not amended and updated in some way as a 
result of Fukushima. But a reformation of energy law as a whole 
would be more remarkable still. At least on President Obama’s 
watch, it seems clear we can count that out.247 
Whether that result is salutary depends on perspective. Plainly, 
American energy law and policy could benefit from an injection of 
both reformed goals and modified processes. Nevertheless, achieving 
this undoubtedly will be a long process. It is unlikely, Eric Freyfogle 
wrote nearly two decades ago, that “Congress will . . . arise one 
morning to reweave, deftly and coherently, the environmental 
portions of the legal fabric.”248 It is equally unlikely that Congress 
will awake one day to change out the entire fuel core of energy law’s 
reactor. With all that energy touches in our economy, with the 
human tendency to focus on the short-term, and with the role that 
immediate results play in preserving political power, simply too much 
is on the line. 
What we might expect, then—what we might hope for—is not a 
total shift in energy law but a gradual one. Certainly energy law and 
environmental law are moving closer together, even if slowly. If 
disasters like Fukushima have something to say about what that 
merger should look like, or how quickly it happens, all the better. 
Much of what environmental law aims to do is to calculate risks, as  
 
 
 245. As one observer put it, “[T]he Fukushima disaster handed no easy victories to either 
side of the nuclear debate: defenders can no longer pretend to have engineered away the risks 
of generating a billion watts in a concrete building, and opponents cannot easily suggest that a 
meltdown will produce the huge number of immediate casualties that the public imagines.” 
Osnos, supra note 17, at 61. 
 246. Id. (“By fall, a consensus had taken hold among Japanese politicians and 
intellectuals: there would not be a sudden end to nuclear power in Japan. The country would 
possibly close some of its oldest plants, but the rest—by one estimate, thirty-six of the fifty-
four reactors—would endure.”). 
 247. See supra Part III.B. 
 248. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Ethical Strands of Environmental Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
819, 846. 
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difficult as that is.249 There is no reason why energy law should not 
account carefully for those risks too.250 
More narrowly, what Fukushima might teach us is that our 
continued reliance on disasters as a heavy driving force for weighing 
what energy law should be is not healthy. Disasters are a relevant 
consideration in any area of the law, but they should not dominate. 
There are many problems with focusing on disasters to encourage 
legal change, least among them the reflexive reactions they can elicit. 
How else can the multiplicity of “[h]asty [n]uclear [u]-[t]urn[s]” 
that took place in Fukushima’s wake be explained251—first 
Germany’s flip from extending the life of its plants to banning them 
altogether, then Japan’s flop in declaring that it would phase out 
nuclear energy, only to clarify that stance as a “personal” and not 
political position, and only then to backtrack further to a posture of 
wait and see? With all the drama they pack, disasters have a tendency 
to push against reason, not just in the popular view of what 
government should do, but in the appraisal of where and how 
resources should be allocated in altering the law as well. In 
Fukushima, we can see a partial answer to this problem. 
U.S. energy law could use more planning. True, planning is 
inherently imperfect. And true, a longstanding maxim of energy 
policy is that all energy predictions end up wrong after the fact.252 
Both points make potential overreliance on planning a warning 
worth taking. They do not, however, justify foregoing the exercise 
altogether. More planning in energy law could add significant 
benefits to the system, including clarifying what our actual objectives 
as a society are, measuring whether we are meeting those objectives, 
specifying those objectives in terms of an ideal generating mix, and 
involving the public in the process. Planning also could help assess 
what role technologies—sometimes quite controversial ones—should 
play in our energy future. By definition, this much more holistic 
assessment would include the benefits and risks different energy 
resources pose. Planning, in short, can be a partial response to the 
sensationalism of disasters. 
 
 249. For one primer on risk assessment, see DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW 
AND POLICY 249–90 (2d ed. 2010). 
 250. Arguably, this is what the NRC licensing process does now for nuclear power. 
 251. Germany’s Hasty Nuclear U-Turn Likely to Come at a Steep Price, ELECTRICITY J., 
Aug.–Sept. 2011, at 3. 
 252. Bosselman, supra note 169, at 52. 
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This kind of energy planning hardly would be a cure-all.253 But it 
would be a step forward. In the shadow of Fukushima, at least that 
much should be clear. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A tragedy like Fukushima offers an opportunity to reassess—to 
step back, take stock, and evaluate more broadly where, as a 
community and as a society, we stand. For some, the perspective this 
exercise offered was obvious. Germany, for one, took a hard turn in 
Fukushima’s aftermath. For others, the view was murkier. In the 
United States, Fukushima, if anything, appeared as a “grim reminder 
of the calculated risk associated with nuclear power.”254 We take 
great benefit from nuclear energy, yet the potential costs of those 
benefits are, though rather remote, exceedingly high. Decades from 
now, Fukushima will still be shorthand for that proposition.  
Ultimately, Fukushima does not fundamentally alter the calculus 
of the nuclear energy risk. The tragedy may shift perceptions, but no 
nuclear facility built today—or on March 10, 2011, for that matter—
would use the design of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The critical 
question thus is not simply what Fukushima means for the future of 
the nuclear industry in the United States but what it means for the 
future of United States energy law. Energy disasters should not be 
the primary drivers of our law; that much is plain. But if we do not 
use them as a chance to at least reconsider what our energy law 
should be, they are a wasted opportunity indeed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 253. For an excellent critique of the deficiency of planning in environmental law, see 
Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265 
(2009). 
 254. Chirag Rathi, A Pause in the Growth of Nuclear Energy, ELECTRICITY J., July 2011, 
at 48, 52. 
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